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HARMONIZING BUSINESS LAWS IN AFRICA: OHADA CALLS THE TUNE
Claire Moore Dickerson*
INTRODUCTION
Economic development in sub-Saharan Africa, including West Africa, has challenged
development economists and legal scholars for decades. Starting in 1993, sixteen West African
countries have taken a revolutionary step. They are addressing the problem themselves, jointly.
Each agreed to give up some national sovereignty in order to establish a single, cross-border
regime of uniform business laws, immediately applicable as the domestic laws of each country.
These are the OHADA (in English, the Organization for Harmonization in Africa of Business
Laws) laws, adopted pursuant to the 1993 OHADA treaty.1
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Traité relatif à l=Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires, 4 JOURNAL OFFICIEL (JO) OHADA 1
(Nov. 1, 1997), available at http://www.ohada.com/traite.php?categorie=10 (last visited Jan. 28, 2005). The law
promulgated under the treaty and relating to business associations was adopted April 17, 1997, effective January 1,
1998. Companies and Agroupements d=intérêt économique@ in existence before January 1, 1998, were accorded an
additional two years before their constitutional documents had to conform to the OHADA law of corporations and
other associations; however, even these businesses were otherwise subject to OHADA laws upon the effective date.
See Act Uniforme relatif au Droit des Sociétés Commerciales et du Groupement d=Intérêt Economique, art. 908, 2 JO
OHADA 1 (Oct. 1, 1997), available at http://www.ohada.com/textes.php?categorie=457 (last visited Jan. 28, 2005).
The charter members of OHADA are Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Cameroon,
Comores, Congo, Côte d=Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo; Guinea and GuineaBissau joined subsequently; all are francophone except for Cameroon (bilingual English-French), Equatorial Guinea
(Spanish) and Guinea-Bissau (Portuguese). See Xavier Forneris, Harmonising Commercial Law in Africa: the
OHADA (MS on file with author) at 2. There are other unifying organizations in the region. There are, for example,
1
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The OHADA laws= articulated purpose is to facilitate investment in general, and foreign
investment in particular.2 These laws are adapted to the needs of a developing economy, and
modernize the chiefly French-system, century-old business laws previously applicable in the
OHADA states. OHADA may materially change the investment climate in West Africa. If
successful, it offers a model for development in other parts of the developing world. This article
presents the first focused analysis of OHADA=s laws and institutions to appear in a United States
law review. In addition, it rebuts common criticisms of the system and offers some early
prognoses on the likelihood of OHADA=s success and on its potential impact.
The OHADA laws retain the strong French flavor of their predecessors.3 As I explain in
two overlapping monetary unions. Joseph Issa-Sayegh, Quelques Aspects Techniques de l=Intégration Juridique:
l=Exemple des Acts Uniformes de l=OHADA, 1 REV. DR. UNIF. 5, 7 (1999) (discussing the UEMOA (Union
Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine), which includes seven of the OHADA countries: Benin, Burkina Faso,
Côte d=Ivoire, Mali, Niger , Senegal and Togo). See also BORIS MARTOR, NANETTE PILKINGTON, DAVID S. SELLERS
& SÉBASTIEN THOUVENOT, BUSINESS LAW IN AFRICA: OHADA AND THE HARMONIZATION PROCESS 295-97 (2002)
(hereinafter BUSLAW) (discussing ECOWAS (in French, CEDEAO), the Economic Community of West African
States, to which Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d=Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, from
OHADA belong, as well as Cap Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone; a merger with UEMOA,
which is more advanced had been contemplated for 2004, but will not occur within that time). There is another
major economic organization that includes OHADA countries, the CEMAC (Communauté Economique et Monétaire
de l=Afrique Centrale), which includes Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea
and Gabon, all OHADA members. See BUSLAW, supra at 293. There is also, of course, the African Union itself; its
website is at http://www.africa-union.org.
2

The OHADA drafters= articulated goal for their legislation is increased foreign investment in order to
enhance economic development. See, e.g., Jacqueline Lohoues-Oble, L=Apparition d=un Droit International des
Affaires en Afrique, 3 REV. IND. DR. COM. 543, 544-47 (1999); see also Philippe LeBoulanger, L=Arbitrage et
l=Harmonisation du Droit des Affaires en Afrique, 3 REV. ARBITRAGE 541, 544 (1999) (describing the founders=
efforts to Aélaborer un droit régional des affaires unique, moderne, susceptible de favoirser le développement
économique@ (in English: to prepare a regional system of laws, unique, modern, and susceptible of favoring
economic development). See also Martin Kirsch, Historique de l=Organisation pour l=Harmonisation du Droit des
Affaires en Afrique [sic] (OHADA), REVUE PENANT 130 (1998) (noting that the author, together with Judge Kéba
Mbaye and a third, were the ADirectoire@ authorized at a conference of heads of state, together with a delegation from
France, to launch the OHADA project; the Directoire kept in mind that the economic development sought by the
heads of state would occur only if the Ainsécurité juridique et judiciaire@ were corrected).
3

See, e.g., MAMADOU KONE, LE NOUVEAU DROIT COMMERCIAL DES PAYS DE LA ZONE OHADA;
COMPARAISONS AVEC LE DROIT FRANÇAIS 16 (2003) (noting that OHADA is based on the French system). See
generally, infra, Part II.A (analyzing the OHADA business laws).
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Part I, recent economic scholarship has asserted that the French legal system may be less
favorable to investment than the common law system. This understanding is consistent with
traditional theories in comparative law. Drawing on other studies I show that a French legal
system is at worst neutral as compared to the common law system.
Underlying these economists= critique is a principally neo-liberal approach to
development that emphasizes liberalizing flows of goods and capital. The OHADA regime,
which I describe in Part II, is agnostic on the topic. While each member-state has committed to
OHADA as its business law regime, the state=s political system remains free to adopt a neoliberal route to development or to be more actively involved in national economic and social
structures.4 For its part, the OHADA laws and institutions are committed to enhancing private
ordering, to creating a reliable, usable system that responds to the needs of a developing
economy, whatever the surrounding political reality. As Part II emphasizes, OHADA=s central
accomplishment is the growing system of modern, business-related statutes. These are supported
by an entire regime: a legislature to adopt a full panoply of business laws, a supranational court
that preserves the laws= uniformity by issuing decisions and interpretations applicable throughout
the OHADA territory, and a permanent secretariat to perform an executive function compatible
with OHADA=s parliamentary-style governance.
Parts II and III also address a non-economic criticism of the OHADA regime: that it is
neocolonial because it bears the influence of a Northern legal system.5 No definitive response is
4

See, e.g., José Antonio Ocampo, Development and the Global Order in RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMICS 82 (Ha-Joon Chang, ed., 2003) (offering an alternative to the neo-liberal paradigm).
5

I heard the most unequivocal assertion of neo-colonialism second-hand. Apparently, a senior official at a
major international financial institution has resisted providing funding to OHADA because he considers it neocolonialist. Interview with KG in Washington, D.C., on December 13, 2004 (discussing funding for OHADA).
3
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possible, of course, but Part II describes how the member-states acceded to the OHADA Treaty
through their respective political systems. Moreover, the legal professionals who work within
the region and use the OHADA laws similarly indicate an affirmative commitment to OHADA.
In the summer of 2004, I conducted interviews with lawyers, judges and academics in the region,
These professionals even spoke of their admiration for the elegance and simplicity of the
OHADA laws.6 As Part II points out, these professionals show that they accept the principle and
reality of OHADA when they seek to strengthen both the interface between OHADA and the
national judicial regimes, and certain aspects of OHADA=s own institutional structure.
What are the long-term effects of the OHADA regime? Because the laws are uniform,
because their Northern form is familiar both to foreigners and to the regional bar and bench, and
because they are clear and accessible, they reduce transaction costs into the region and among the

6

I conducted 33 interviews in West Africa. Six were in Dakar, Senegal. In Dakar, the interviewees
included four Senegalese (one practitioner, one in-house counsel, one senior bureaucrat in the Ministry of Justice,
and the Hon. Kéba Mbaye, who is a former Vice Chair of the International Court of Justice in the Hague, a former
justice on Senegal=s highest court, and motivating force behind OHADA. The other two interviewees in Dakar were
a French tax specialist and an economics officer at the US Consulate. Ten interviews were in Abidjan, Côte d=Ivoire;
nine of the interviewees were Ivoirian, and the tenth was a US economics officer at the US embassy. The nine local
persons were two practitioners, two in-house counsel, one senior bureaucrat in the Ministry of Justice, three judges
(including one from the OHADA CCJA) and one professor. In Cameroon, I interviewed twenty-nine people in three
cities: thirteen (one by telephone) in Douala, the commercial capital; six in Buéa, arguably the commercial capital of
the anglophone part of Cameroon; and ten in Yaoundé, Cameroon=s political capital; Douala and Yaoundé are
francophone. All of the interviewees were Cameroonian except for the economics officer at the US Consulate in
Douala, who is Nigerian, and one professors and one student I met in Yaoundé, both of whom also are Nigerian. In
Douala, I interviewed three judges, five practitioners, two in-house counsel, one senior officer in a US-based bank
and the US economics officer. In Buéa, I interviewed one judge, one in-house counsel, and four business people. In
Yaoundé, I interviewed four professors (one Nigerian, one from Buéa, one from Yaoundé II, and one from
Dschang), two judges, one high-level bureaucrat from the OHADA structure, one practitioner, and two students (one
Nigerian, and the other from Buéa).
Most of these professionals had trained in a French-source legal system, but a few had received an
essentially common-law education. *Under its constitution, Cameroon is bilingual (French and English) and bi-jural.
Available in English at http://confinder.richmond.edu/Cameroon.htm (last visited March 1, 2005), and in French at
http://www.camnet.cm/celcom/institut/constitu/consti%7E1.htm (last visited March 1, 2005). There is an Englishlanguage, common-law university in Buéa, Cameroon.
In this article, I have fully identified some of the interviewees but in the main have not done so. Notes are
on file with author.
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states within the OHADA territory. Because legal professionals in the region respect the quality
and integrity of the decisions of OHADA=s supranational court, transaction costs may well fall
further. Potential investors, both domestic and foreign, have greater assurance that their private
arrangements will be respected.
But OHADA may accomplish much more. It may prove to be an invaluable and
exportable tool for the South because its uniform business laws presenting a unified face to the
commercial power of the North. As Part III emphasizes, the first OHADA laws became effective
only in 1998, and we cannot yet be certain of the OHADA regime=s impact. However, if it is
successful in West Africa, it can be a model within the developing world, especially in other
African countries because of their proximity, but also in any region with a civilian legal system.
Latin America, for example, could benefit directly, since its legal systems trace their roots back
to France.7 The early indications are mixed, but offer reason for optimism.

I.

THE OHADA LAWS AND DEVELOPMENT
The OHADA regime offers both an example and a laboratory. It illustrates an approach,

and although the experience is still young, half-a-dozen years is a beginning. At the time when
the OHADA Treaty was signed, most of the signatories already had in place a French-based legal

7

See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and
Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1118 (1998) (discussing the influence of the French legal Afamily@on Spanish and
Portuguese law); George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 683, 697
(1998) (discussing the French influence in the laws of Latin American countries); Richard Azarnia, Tort Law in
France: A Cultural and Comparative Overview, 13 WIS. INT=L L.J. 471, 472 n.6 (1995) (noting the Napoleonic
Code=s influence in former French colonies, and in Latin America); Victor Ml. Garita, Conceptual Basis for a New
Arbitral Statute for Costa Rica: A New Approach in Latin America, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1633, 1642 (1991) (asserting
that Spain was the Abridge@ between French law and Latin America).
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system, albeit not necessarily the most recent version,8 and OHADA itself is heavily based on the
French legal system.9 Can it really be expected to attract foreign investment as its drafters
anticipated? More broadly, can it be a pro-development tool?

A.

DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD: THE RULE OF LAW

The problem of development is intractable.10 Since World War II, the best minds in

8

See, e.g., KONÉ, supra note 3 at 10-11. Guinea Bissau was a longtime Portuguese colony, and Equatorial
Guinea a Spanish colony. See Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, Background Note, Guinea-Bissau,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5454.htm (April 2004) (last visited Aug. 3, 2004); CIA, Equitorial Guinea, WORLD
FACTBOOK (May 11, 2004), available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ek.html (last visited Aug.
4, 2004). These, in their turn, trace their origins to the French system. See, e.g., La Porta, et al., supra note 7 at
1118 (discussing the influence of the French legal Afamily@on Spanish and Portuguese law).
9

See KONÉ, supra note 3 at 16 (OHADA=s similarity to French law). A legendary reformer of French law
has described that law as rigid and inflexible. PHILIPPE MARINI, LA MODERNISATION DU DROIT DES SOCIÉTÉS 19-21
(1996) (acknowledging that the trend of French corporate law has been toward greater flexibility). But see Naomi R.
Lamoureaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Legal Regime and Business=s Organizational Choice: A Comparison of
France and the United States during the Mid-Nineteenth Century (February 2004), AM. L. & ECON. REV.
(forthcoming), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10288.pdf (downloaded Mar.23, 2004) (arguing that the
French legal system=s plethora of business forms actually provided flexibility, and that the flexibility that had
developed in the US system by the end of the 20th century was due not to the common law=s graceful evolution, but
to statutory changes). Lamoreaux and Rosenthal suggest that the correlation between French law and developing
countries= economic stagnation may indicate that the French system operates differently in developing countries as
compared to France. Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, supra at 28 (speculating on different effects in developing countries).
10

The definition of development is not easy either. For purposes of this article, I use economic growth as a
proxy for development. Because economic growth increases the size of the pie, it is likely to contribute to indicators
of development. For example, it is likely to reduce mortality, to increase life expectancy and, generally, to
contribute to human capability. For a discussion of a definition of development, consider the assertion of Jeffrey
Sachs and his co-authors that development can be measured by analyzing a combination of gross national income
(the World Bank=s replacement for gross domestic product), average annual growth in gross domestic product per
capita, life expectancy at birth, under-five mortality rate, and the annual growth of the population Jeffrey Sachs, John
W. MacArthur, Guido Schmidt-Traub, Margaret Kruk, Chandrika Bahadur, Michael Faye & Gordon McCord,
Ending Africa=s Poverty Trap, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 117, 118 (2004) (selecting certain
indicators of development). Amartya Sen speaks in terms of Ahuman capability.@ The goal is to achieve a society
wherein people can live the life they would plan for themselves, which means that the social structures. Importantly,
the question is not whether the individual in fact so functions; rather, the issue is whether he or she has the choice to
do so. AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 30-31 (1982) (discussing capability as the ability to
function as the individual wishes); Sen, Choice, 30-31 (capability as functioning, as choice). To have capability
means Abeing adequately nourished and being free from avoidable disease,@ but it also means Abeing able to take part
in the life of the community and having self-respect.@ Government structures should support this effort, but do so by
focusing on the individual instead of systems. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 75, 144 (1999).
(discussing capability as a kind of freedom and the state=s role in supporting the capabilities of education and
6
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development economics have promoted a neoliberal agenda.11 The result of neoliberalism has
been disappointing for sub-Saharan Africa, a geographic area that includes West Africa in
general and the OHADA territory in particular. Despite the influence of neoliberal ideology, the
region has lost ground compared with other parts of the world.12 While direct investment to the
developing world increased substantially in the last two decades of the twentieth century, the
portion of world-wide capital and goods flowing into sub-Saharan Africa has shrunk by almost
two-thirds in that period.13 The region=s experience in trade of goods has been no more
satisfactory. In those same last two decades, exports from sub-Saharan Africa actually fell even
when measured in nominal dollars. Excluding South Africa, exports of manufactured goods
from sub-Saharan Africa did not manage to rise by even ten percent.14 This double failure is
particularly devastating given the evidence that a free flow of both capital and goods correlates

welfare). For others, the right to development focuses on the rights of states, with a strong sense that each state has
the right to determine its own meaning of Adevelopment.@ See, e.g., Mohammed Bedjaoui, The Right to
Development in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 1117 (Mohammed Bedjaoui, ed., 1991) at
1182 (describing the right to development in the context of the right of a state as against other states). As noted in
the Introduction, the precise definition of development is not essential to this paper because OHADA focuses on
private ordering and is neutral as to how the a national government relates to investors, whether foreign or domestic,
in terms of conditions and the like. While no regime can force a national government to respect its obligations under
domestic and international law, the OHADA regimeBlike any otherBhas to operate with the expectation that it will do
so.
11

Ha-Joon Chang, Rethinking Development Economics: An Introduction in RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMICS (Ha-Joon Chang, ed. 2003) at 1, 1-3 (noting that neoliberal development economics has been dominated
by calls for Aextensive privatization, radical deregulation, total opening-up of goods and capital markets, and
tightening of macroeconomic policy@).
12

See, e.g., Sachs et al., supra note 10 at 118 (discussing failure of development in sub-Saharan Africa).

13

Howard Stein, Rethinking African Development in RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS (Ha-Joon
Chang, ed. 2003) at 153, 154 (discussing foreign direct investment). Africa-to-Africa foreign private investment, as
distinguished from classic North-to-South investment, may be a very important potential source of funds for the
OHADA territory. See Nicole Itano, South African Companies Fill a Void, NY TIMES (Nov. 4, 2003) (describing
South African companies= investment within Africa).
14

Stein, supra note 13 at 155-56. Meantime, total world trade tripled, and percentage of manufactured
goods exported by East Asian an Pacific countries increased from 52% to 78%.
7
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positively with economic development.15 And even if a developing country rejects the pure
neoliberal insistence on a wholly free-flow of capital and goods, and chooses instead to retain
some barriers to trade, for example in order to protect an evolving industry, the ability to engage
in global trade nevertheless correlates positively with economic growth.16
Despite (or because of) the neoliberal efforts, the region has suffered from a lack of
financial resources. The gap between gross national savings and domestic investment has
continued to grow; inevitably gross domestic investment has decreased. In order to support even
this reduced level of investment, sub-Saharan Africa has had to resort to government debt to
replace the missing private capital inflows, resulting in brutal debt-to-export ratios.17 In the final
two decades of the last century, gross national product fell; in real terms, per-capita gross
national product fell almost forty percent.18 Clearly, the neoliberal efforts have foundered.19

15

Raghuran G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Great Reversals: The Politics of Economic Development in the
Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN=L. ECON. 5, 22, 24, 37, 45 (2003) (discussing free flow of goods and capital as a means
of reducing interest groups= opposition to financial development).
16

See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 17 (2002) (emphasizing that Arapid@
liberalization of trade or capital can leave a developing country vulnerable and, among other consequences, destroy
jobs). See also Ha-Joon Chang, Only Protection Can Build Developing Economies; Unfree Global Markets, LE
MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (Aug. 2003), available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/econ/2003/08freetradehistory.htm (downloaded Feb. 25, 2005) (asserting that
some protectionism is essential to development). Access to markets, however, is important. See, e.g., Sachs, et al.,
supra note 10 at 131 (discussing the correlation between access to a larger market and economic growth).
17

Stein, supra note 13 at 157

18

Id. at 158 (Per capita GNP fell by 39% from 1980 to 2000)

19

The OHADA drafters= articulated goal for their legislation is increased foreign investment in order to
enhance economic development. See supra note 2. That goal focuses the discussion here. Nevertheless, a complete
analysis should consider whether economic development is itself a proxy for some other value. For example, for
Amartya Sen the ultimate goal to enhance human capability, that is, to promote each person=s ability to function as
the individual wishes. SEN, CHOICE, supra note 10 at 30-31; SEN, FREEDOM, supra note 10 at 74-75. This concept
means not only an increase in per capita income so that the person in fact possesses viable choices (opportunities),
but also the freedom B political and social B so that the person can as a practical matter function as he or she wishes.
SEN, FREEDOM, supra note 10 at 290-91.

8

Draft 031605

The question now is whether a new inflow of foreign investment, presumably configured
differently from past transfers, could improve on that realityBor at least play a part in such a
change.20 And, if the answer is affirmative, to what extent can a legal regime play a positive
role? Perhaps it is indeed true that the focus must be on manufacturing, by analogy to the Asian
experience where manufacturing was the engine for development.21 This, however, cannot be the
only answer: before 2000, the Côte d=Ivoire was sub-Saharan Africa=s second most industrialized
country, after only South Africa.22 Nevertheless, the Côte d=Ivoire=s per capita gross national
income fell from US$ 1,140 in 1980 to US$ 600 in 2000Band that was before the disastrous civil
war that has torn the country since September 19, 2002.23 The real learning may be that while
foreign investment will be essential as a source of funds, equally critical is a fundamental change
in the social institutions. Ultimately, the goal is to promote trade, and specifically to increase
exports in order to generate additional resources from outside the region.24 In this regard
20

See, e.g., Sachs et al., supra note 10 at 167 et seq.(proposing a comprehensive set of terms for donorrecipient agreements geared to reduce poverty within the nation receiving foreign investment).
21

Id. [Stein, supra note 13 at 169. Aoviding reliance on the export of primary goods skirts the risk of
immiserizing growth. See also PETER H. LINDERT & CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 81104 (7th ed. 1982) (discussing Aimmiserizing growth@).
22

Jean-Paul Azam, Marie-Françoise Calmette, Catherine Loustalan & Christine Maurel, Domestic
Competition and Export Performance of Manufacturing Firms in Côte d=Ivoire 16 (July 2000), available at
http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/2001-01text.pdf (downloaded Dec. 1, 2003).
23

2000 World Development Indicators CD-ROM, World Bank (Côte d=Ivoire). For a definition of gross
national income, see infra note 172. The use of year 2000 is important because it pre-dates the recent, devastating
civil unrest in the Côte d=Ivoire, which did not begin in earnest until September 19, 2002. See, e.g., United Nations
Mission in Côte d=Ivoire (MINUCI), Background, available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minuci/background.html (last visited April 2, 2004) (discussing the civil
unrest). See also Human Rights Watch, Trapped Between Two Wars: Violence Against Civilians in Western Côte
d=Ivoire (August 2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/cotedivoire0803/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2005)
(describing the history and consequences of the civil war in the Côte d=Ivoire).
24

See Rajan & Zigales, supra note 15 at 5, 22, 24, 36-39 & 45 (asserting that economic development is
positively correlated with a free flow of both capital and goods). See also Stein, supra note 13 at 170-71 (noting that
9
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formalization of local capital investment, too, may be important in its own right, and not just as a
means to the foreign-investment end. The revised institutions can be structured to encourage
domestic economic development: once the basic social institutions have proved to be conducive
to local commerce, the political, economic and social institutions will be in a position to attract
foreign investment.
The Peruvian economist, Hernando de Soto, has estimated that over half the economic
output of developing countries is generated from extralegal sectors, and that the poor have
unofficial, extralegal interests in over US$90 trillion of real estate in the developing world.25
The problem is to harness that wealth: in the developed world, as much as seventy percent of
credit used in new businesses is generated through loans secured by mortgages.26 The informal
economy is significant in the OHADA territory, too;27 a commercial law that integrates the
informal economy into the formal one may help put existing capital to work.
If properly designed, the law could have strong pro-development effects by both
encouraging capital investment and facilitating trade.28 As the law improves its predictability, it
both affects and is affected by behaviors and norms, ideally creating and supporting a pro-

these reform efforts will include a combination of private and governmental efforts). But see STIGLITZ, supra note 16
at 17 (advising against a developing country=s Arapid liberalization@ of trade and capital).
25

HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS
EVERYWHERE ELSE 85 (2000) (discussing extralegal sectors); id. at 35 (discussing unofficial real estate interests).
26

Id. at 84.

27

For example, in the Côte d=Ivoire. See Jean-Pierre Lachaud, Le Secteur Informel Urbain et
l=Informatisation du Travail en Afrique: Rhétorique et Réalités; Le Cas de la Côte d=Ivoire, Working Paper #5
(1997), available at http://ced.u-bordeaux4.fr/ (downloaded Jan. 19, 2004) (describing the Côte d=Ivoire=s informal
economies and their increasing size).
28

Rajan & Zingales, supra note 15 at 36-39 (discussing the correlation between economic development and
the free flow of goods and capital).
10
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development virtuous cycle.29 I am not asserting that business law by itself can solve all
problems.30 However, it can be part of the solution. For example, if law helps create a
commercial environment where expectations are meaningful because corruption does not trump
overt arrangements, domestic and foreign investment and trade, including exports, become less
costly.31

B.

COMPARATIVE LAW=S CHALLENGE TO OHADA=S FRENCH-CIVILIAN ORIGINS

Even if law can be a tool for development, is OHADA the appropriate flavor of law? For
historical reasons, namely that the original treaty members were almost all former French
colonies, and that the outliers shared a civilian law heritage, the OHADA laws are clearly and
frankly based on French business laws. Both the laws and the structure of OHADA are a work in
progress but, before espousing continuing support for those laws in their West African context,
and certainly before encouraging their extension to anglophone neighbors and even to new civil
law arenas such as Latin America, we must consider their efficacy. Older comparative-law
29

The Uniform Commercial Code describes Acertainty and predictability [as] underlying modern commercial
law.@ U.C.C. '1-301 cmt. 6 (2002). For a discussion of the relationship between evolving norms and laws, see
generally Claire M. Dickerson, Ozymandias As a Community Project: Managerial/Corporate Social Responsibility
and the Failure of Transparency, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1035 (2003) (discussing the feed-back loop between societal
norms and governmental statutory, regulatory and judicial actions, in the context of corporate governance).
30

There are so many possible impediments to development, including the extent of ethnic divisions within a
region. See William Easterly & Ross Levine, Africa=s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions, 112 Q.J.
ECON. 1203, 1220, 1241 (1997) (arguing that there is an inverse correlation between ethnic divisions and economic
development; 4 of the soon 17 members of OHADA are among the 15 most ethnically diverse states from among 66
studied worldwide). While business law broadly defined can address issues of discrimination, obviously, it cannot
remove ethnic differences.
Consider also the devastating impact of AIDS in the region. See, e.g., Lori Bollinger, John Stover &
Benjamin Zanou, L=Impact Economique du SIDA en Côte d=Ivoire: Résultats d=un Examen de la Littérature, (Sept.
1999), available at http://www.policyproject.com/pubs/SEImpact/ivoirebr.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004)
31

See Stein, supra note 13 at 170-71 (discussing the importance of transparency and trust, among other

factors).
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literature has suggested that the civil law system, and in particular French laws, do not travel
well. If, as the analysis asserts, French law indeed impedes development, OHADA is a doubtful
choice for implementing the role of law as a path to development. Fortunately for the OHADA
members, modern analysis suggests that the French legal system only correlates negatively with
development, but does not impede it.

1.

Law and Finance theory

The older of comparative law=s two flavors of theoretic lens is the law and finance theory.
First articulated almost half a century ago,32 this theory has been powerfully restated in the past
half-dozen years by a team of economists.33 According to the law and finance theory, countries
having inherited the civil-law system, and in particular the French civil-law system, will tend to
be less economically successful than countries having inherited the British, or common-law
system.34 The focus here is on the legal system.
The argument that French-based law is inappropriate to a developing economy is

32

FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 54-70 (1960) (discussing the different conceptions
of liberty and property inherent in the British versus French legal systems); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW,
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF THE LIBERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
(1973). See also Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Ross Levine, Law, Endowments and Finance, 70 J. FIN=L
ECON. 138-39 (2003) (discussing the law and finance theory).
33

See La Porta et al., Law & Finance, supra note 7. The importance of this perspective is underscored by
the wide-ranging interest it has garnered, as evidenced by a discussion in a magazine of relatively general circulation.
See Nicholas Thompson, Common Denominator, 2005-FEBLEGAL AFF. 46 (discussing the Shleifer and Visney=s law
and finance theory, referring specifically to La Porta et al., Law & Finance, surpa, and commenting on the French
government=s attention to the thesis).
34

HAYEK, CONSTITUTION, supra note 32 at 54-70 (discussing the different conceptions of liberty and
property inherent in the British versus French legal systems); HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, supra note 32. See also
Beck, et al., Endowments, supra note 32 at 138-39 (discussing the law and finance theory), and La Porta, et al., Law
& Finance, supra note 7 at 1149-50 (concluding that French law is Ainvestor-unfriendly@).
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grounded in history. The more traditional presentation asserts that the French Napoleonic Code=s
breathtaking detail was designed to remove all discretion from a judiciary that had been
notoriously obstreperous.35 The judges had manifested their anti-free market tendencies notably
in the context of real property, where they strove to sustain the aristocrats= feudal rights against
the king.36 As much as these anti-market tendencies may have inconvenienced the king, they
also thwarted the future revolutionaries= belief in a natural-law right to property.37
The consequence of the Napoleonic response is that the Code empowers the executive
over the judiciary and creates an environment more dirigiste than free market, arguably resulting
in inefficiencies.38 In addition, the business laws of French-legal system countries appear on
their face to be less protective of both shareholders= rights as against managers, and creditors=

35

John Henry Merryman, The French Deviation, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 109, 109-11 (1996) (discussing the
pre-revolutionary French judiciary=s alignment with the aristocracy against the monarchy, the post-revolutionary
dictatorship=s desire to have the executive dominate, and the resultant stripping of legislative and interpretative
authority from judges); RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, HANS W. BAADE, PETER E. HERZOG & EDWARD M. WISE,
COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES-TEXT-MATERIALS 235-36 n.1 (6th ed. 1998) (discussing abuse by 18th century
parlements and the resultant suspicion of Ajudicial legislation@, leading to a weakened post-revolutionary judiciary);
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, DAVID S. CLARK & JOHN O. HALEY, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE LATIN AMERICA
AND EAST AISA 439-40 (1994) (noting the Napoleonic dictatorship=s mistrust of judges because of their prerevolutionary opposition to authority). See also JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN,, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION; AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 15 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing the
pre-Revolutionary judges= corruption).
Note that the Napoleonic Code is neither the summa of codes, nor the last word in French law. The German
Code of 1896 was more detailed and yet more comprehensive. See, e.g., SCHLESINGER, et al., supra, at 236-38, 248
(describing the detailed and comprehensive nature of the German Code). The modern trend in French law to replace
the Code by specific statutory pronouncements. See, e.g., John Henry Merryman, How Others Do It: The French
and German Judiciaries, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1865, 1868-70 (1988) (describing decodification through statutes, such
as labor law statutes, and the increase in administrative procedures).
36

See MERRYMAN, INTRODUCTION, supra note 35 at 15 (discussing the judges= support of the feudal

37

Id. at 16 (discussing the revolutionaries= belief in natural rights to property).

system).

38

Beck et al., Endowments, supra note32 at 139; Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic
Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 505 (2001) (referring to indications that, as a whole, civil
law countries have developed less well than common law countries).
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rights as against debtors, than are their common-law analogues.39 This suggests that the French
structure is less protective of property rights. Conceivably, even in such a situation a welldeveloped legal profession could create a space for a protection of property rights specifically
through contractual provisions, and for protection against abuse of power by the executive
through use of all remedial tools.40 While many factors have contributed to France=s economic
success,41 one difference between the legal structure of France and that of developing countries
with a French-based legal system is the that the presence of many more lawyers per capita in
France may mean that the legal forms are used more flexibly in France.42 I am showing a
correlation rather than claiming causation, but whatever protection lawyers can offer would be
far less available in developing countries where, among other differences, the lawyer-per-capita
ratio is far lower.43 The hypothesis is that developing countries= legal infrastructure, possessing

39

See La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 7 at 1129, 1132, 1138 (comparing rights of shareholders
and creditors under the French legal system with those under the common law system).
40

For example, a remedial tool that helps protect some shareholder rights are preemptive rights, more fully
discussed infra at notes 121-23. See La Porta et al., Law & Finance, supra note 7 at 1132 (discussing preemptive
rights as a remedial measure for the protection of shareholders). As against the government, a critical effort would
be to avoid expropriation without adequate compensation, i.e., corruption.
41

La Porta, et al., Law & Finance, supra note 7 at 1142 (France=s per capita GNP is 91% of the US=s).
During a 3-decade period from the end of WWII through 1975, French governmental intervention in the economy let
to a growth rate greater than that of the US. See JAMES CORBETT, THROUGH FRENCH WINDOWS 301 (1975); Perry E.
Wallace, The Globalization of Corporate Governance: Shareholder Protection, Hostile Takeovers and the Evolving
Corporate Environment in France, 18 CONN. J. INT=L L. 1 (2002) (describing the ATrente Glorieuses@).
42

See Ray August, Mythical Kingdom of Lawyers: America Doesn=t have 70% of the Earth=s Lawyers, 78
ABA JOURNAL 72-74 (September 1992), available at http://august1.com/pubs/articles/lawyers.htm (last visited Aug.
4, 2004) (France has more than 1-1/2 times the number of lawyers per capita as does the US).
43

Alain Agboton, Senegal - Justice, Fiction and Reality, http://www.peacelink.it/anb-bia/nr337/e19.html
(downloaded Oct. 15, 2003) (reporting that in 1998, there were in Senegal 270 practicing lawyers, 30 in training;
240 in Dakar where 90% commerce). In July 2004, Senegal=s population was approximately 10.9 million people.
CIA, Senegal, WORLD FACTBOOK, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sg.html#People
(last visited Aug. 4, 2004). These figures, suggest 1:39,000 lawyers for Senegal (although the ration may be a bit
less high since Senegal=s population has increased since 1998). Another study suggests that the ratio in Senegal may
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few lawyers to wring maximum protection from it, while maintaining the relatively weak
judiciary inherited from the French legal system, simply cannot challenge the executive=s
interference in the markets.44
Another difference between the France=s legal system and that of developing countries
may be that the latter are adopting France=s rhetoric, but not its reality. In France, despite all the
talk about Napoleonic transfer of power from the judiciary to the executive, in fact the French
judiciary is as strong as it needs to be to do its job. In France, the judiciary does make law,
however much it claims only to interpret the codes and statutes.45
Ultimately, however, complaining about the inadequacy of the French system as applied
in developing countries is relevant to OHADA=s choice of French law only if another system is
more successful within the developing world. The traditional law and finance argument reports
that, unlike the French system, the common-law system evolved not to protect the State from the
judiciary, but to protect private property from the State.46 To the extent that the state is excluded,

be higher: 2.67 per 10,000, at least in the 1980s. See August, supra note 42. The same study reports that the Côte
d=Ivoire boasted 8.98 lawyers per 10,000 people during the 1980s (long before the current civil war), while the
United States sported 28.45 per 10,000, and France a whopping 46.34 per 10,000. See supra August. Other rough
numbers offered for the United States suggest 37.74 lawyers per 10,000 in 2000. See Frederick L. Trilling, The
Strategic Application of Business Methods to the Practice of Law, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 13, 17 (1998) (projecting the
ratio of lawyers to population of the United States to be at 1:265 in 2000). See also Marc Galanter, News from
Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 77, 77-83 (1993) (emphasizing how difficult it
is to measure the number of lawyers for comparative purposes).
44

See La Porta et al., Law & Finance, supra note 7 at 1139-40 (arguing that stricter enforcement may be a
way of remedying the inherently less investor-friendly aspects of French law).
45

See, e.g., Merryman, Deviation, supra note 35 at 116 (asserting that the French legal system has failed
when Aexported@ to developing countries because the recipient communities adopt the weak judiciary, but do not
include the sub rosa judicial law-making). See also André Tunc, Methodology of the civil Law in France, 50
TULANE L. REV. 459, 464-66, 470-73 (1976) (discussing French judges= use of prior case law and of academic
scholarship to support their decisions modernizing the law, including extending the law of liability to damages and
injury caused by inanimate objects).
46

See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 38 at 508-11 (describing legal history: pro-property for British common
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market forces tend to dominate.
The newer flavor of law and finance theory continues this comparative argument, but uses
a statistical analysis of certain characteristics of various legal systems. For example, after
comparing the French-origin legal system with the common-law regime, and with German and
Scandinavian civil-law regimes, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
and Robert W. Vishny (ALLSV@) conclude that the French-origin legal systems provide the
weakest protection for creditors and shareholders, both by the laws= terms and by the level of
enforcement.47 For their analysis, the authors focus exclusively on the laws of business
organizations and of bankruptcy-reorganization.48 LLSV do concede that investors may be better
protected than French laws on their face suggest, since ownership in French-system countries
tends to be concentrated. This high ownership-concentration may represent business people=s
response to a perceived deficiency in the laws, as the owners can then use the power accorded by
their relatively high ownership participation to protect their own interests.49 Corporations in
West Africa=s developing markets may already benefit from this practical protection: the region=s

law; anti-judiciary for French post-Revolutionary law); but see Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, supra note 9 at 27
(asserting that corporate law changes in the United States were effected not by the common law=s evolution, but by
statute). See also La Porta et al., Law & Finance, supra note 7 at 1129, 1138-39 (common law countries on average
offer better protection to shareholders and creditors than do countries whose law is based on French law, although
the US is only weakly protective of creditors).
47

La Porta et al., Law & Finance, supra note 7 at 1116, 1129-32, 1136-39, 1141 (discussing different
regimes= relative protection of shareholders and creditors, including enforcement).
48

Id. at 1120.

49

Id. at 1148 (referring to a concentration of ownership as potentially an Aadaptation@). This suggests that
the authors consider ownership concentration to have appeared after the Napoleonic codes restricted judicial
authority. That is a reasonable assumption for our purposes, given that the first Napoleonic codes were adopted in
1804, and it was not until 1867 that French corporations could be formed without governmental approval, meaning
that corporations became Aoff-the-rack@ organizations, subject to standard terms. See id. at 5-6 (noting that French
corporations required express governmental approval before 1867).
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public markets are few and very small compared to developed countries, and ownership
concentrations thus are relatively high.50
While these new law and finance authors do conclude that the French system is less
protective of investor property than is the common-law system, they hesitate on the brink of
claiming a true causal relationship between the French legal system and economic failure, and
between the common law and economic success.51 Common-law countries include the United
States, the United Kingdom and Australia, but they also include Zimbabwe. The French-origin
countries listed include Indonesia, but also Belgium and FranceBthe latter two being, as the
authors expressly note, Avery rich countries.@52
There is strong evidence of a correlation between property protection, financial
development and growth,53 but it was only the traditional law and finance theorists who
maintained that the common-law system, being directly focused on protecting property, is
inherently better-suited to supporting capitalist impulses even in developing countries.

50

See, e.g., infra Part II.A.2.b (discussing the limited public ownership of corporations in West Africa).

51

Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Legal Determinants of
External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1146 (1997) (the authors do find a relationship between legal origin and the
Abreadth of their capital markets@).
52

See La Porta et al., Law & Finance, supra note 7 at 1151-52 (asserting that the French-civil-law family
offers the least protection for investors, resulting in higher concentrations of ownership and less liquid markets, but
also noting that France and Belgium Aare both very rich countries@). This argument is a neat segue to the next
section, since it focuses on the historical influence, but also makes claims about the survival of social institutions. La
Porta et al. do emphasize the contextual nature of the investor-protections they study, although they do not argue that
the differences in the laws are geared to make outcomes identical. Id. at 1132. See also Daniel Berkowitz,
Katharina Pistor & Jean-François Richard, The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163, 185-86 (2003) (asserting
that how legal institutions are transplanted is important, too: involuntary receipt is more negatively correlated with
GDP than is the identity of the particular legal family implanted, although French law is negatively correlated with
GDP; the worst combination for development is a non-OECD country=s involuntary receipt of French law).
53

Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Investor Protection
and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN=L ECON. 3, 16 (2000) (referring to earlier studies evidencing the correlation).
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Explanation
2.

Comparative s Not Based on the Legal System

Other recent comparative theories, too, seek to explain the failure of certain countries to
develop, but operate by debunking the emphasis on legal systems.
(a) Open trade and free flow of capital. In direct response to LLSV, Rajan and Zingales
point out that in 1913 and 1929, civil-law countries were no less developed than were commonlaw countries, and that civil-law countries= relative economic weakness is a post-World War II
phenomenon. Part of the reason, according to these authors, is that the civil law is more
centralized and thus more easily co-opted. However, the civil law, because of the centralization,
also more easily benefits from pro-development initiatives. There may be more volatility in
civil-law countries= rate of development than in that of common-law countries, which means that
the civilian system tends to suffer more on the downside, but also experience a higher rate of
improvement on the upside.54
Thus, Rajan and Zingales see the civil law versus common law debate as far more
inconclusive than do LLSV. Indeed, Rajan and Zingales assert that a free flow of goods,
especially when coupled with a free flow of capital, is far more predictive of economic growth
than is the country=s legal system.55 These factors open the country=s economy to global
pressures and, therefore, especially when present in tandem, limit private interests= ability to

54

Rajan & Zingales, supra note 15 at 42-45 (discussing relative rates of improvement between investor
protection and financial development, and between financial development and economic growth).
55

This does not necessarily mean that a free flow of goods and capital is in each event the best outcome for
a developing economy. See supra note 16 (discussing Stiglitz=s and Chang=s views against full liberalization). The
point, here, is that the French system at least is no worse than the common-law system.
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control the political system to their own advantage.56 In other words, avoiding a French-based
legal system will not necessarily have any pro-development benefit, but controlling private
interests= ability to control the economic system will pay dividends.
For our purposes, we need not adopt Ragan and Zingales=s emphasis that freely flowing
trade and capital is essential to economic development. Other economists maintain that a focus
on social as well as economic measures is critical to development.57 However, both ends of the
spectrum anticipate the need for significant additional capital inflows,58 and to the extent that the
capital inflow requires private ordering for the application of those funds, the local legal regime
is implicated. According to Ragan and Zingales, a French-based legal system will at least be no
worse than a common-law system.
(b) Endowment theory. The endowment theorists maintain that the environment that
European settlers encountered, and not the legal systems they brought with them, determines
whether a country is successful in the post-colonial period. Again, the choice of legal system is
trumped by other factors.
If the Europeans experienced significant disease and mortality, they tended to establish
authoritarian, extractive institutions designed purely to derive maximum profits from the

56

Rajan & Zingales, supra note 15 at 36-39, 43 (discussing how global economic pressures resulting from
the free flow of goods and capital limit private interests= ability to seize rents from the local economy).
57

See, e.g., Ocampo, supra note 4 at 101 (calling for developing countries to assert broad goals such as
Ahuman development,@ instead of focusing narrowly on purely economic measures).
58

See id. at 100 (emphasizing the Alinkages between economic and social development@). See e.g., Sachs et
al., supra note 10 at 164 (describing the sources of funding for three countries to meet the Millennium Development
Goals for three African countries, including identifying the domestic and external funding needs).
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colony.59 If the Europeans landed in an environment where they did not fall sick, they tended to
settle permanently and to establish relatively democratic institutions.60 After independence,
whatever institutions the European settlers had previously established, democratic or not,
became part of the countries= post-colonial endowments.61 Compare the outcomes in North
America, Australia, New Zealand with those in, for example, Cameroon, Côte d=Ivoire and
Senegal: settler mortality in the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries was much higher in the
latter group, and its current per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is much lower.62
There is, indeed, evidence that institutions survived the transition to independence.63
Post-independence, new leaders willingly stepped into the existing authoritarian, extractive
institutions.64 This is proof, the endowment theory asserts, that settler mortality is negatively
correlated with development.
In the process, the endowment theorists assert that the French legal system may not be
59

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of Comparative
Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369 (Dec. 2001), Appendix Table A2 including first
graph. The authors do not dispute that countries having inherited the French legal system are, on the whole, less
economically developed than countries having inherited a common law system. However, the factor of French legal
origin does not affect their results. Id. At 1388.
60

Id. at 1376 (institutions persist)

61

See also Beck et al., supra note 32 at 11-13 (generally agreeing with the conclusions of Acemoglu et al.,
supra note 59).
62

The settler mortality figures are based on number of deaths per annum, per A1,000 soldiers, where each
death is replaced with a new soldier.@ Acemoglu et al., supra note 59 at 1382. The range is not subtle: whereas the
US, which is not the lowest of the group, shows 15 deaths, Senegal showed 164.66, and Côte d=Ivoire, 668. Id.,
Appendix Table A2 at 1398 (the per capita GDP figures are from 1995).
63

See, id. at 1736 (discussing, inter alia, Mobutu=s Zaire). Zaire, renamed the Democratic Republic of
Congo (ARDC@ in French) is slated to join OHADA shortly. See www.ohada.com.
64

See Acemoglu et al., supra note 59 at 1395 (confirming that extractive, authoritarian institutions, such as
the colonial regime in Congo, did survive, but also cautioning that institutions are not the only determinant of future
economic success).
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separately correlated with lack of development.65 Despite the fact that, on average, the common
law countries= legal provisions protect investors better than do those of civil law countries,
especially French civil law countries,66 the endowment theorists maintain that the slow
development of countries with the French legal system relative to those with the common law
system is merely an artifact of history. The French legal system is correlated with slow
development, but does not necessarily cause it.

3.

Remedial Steps

What, then, can we learn for the future from this analysis? The law and finance adherents
at worst see a suspect correlation between a French legal system and failure of economic
development. For their part, even the advocates for free flow of goods and capital, and the
endowment theorists have rejected a causal relationship between the French legal system and
lack of economic development. However, because proving the negative is impossible, a riskaverse response will let stand the French system, but introduce changes to reduce the
impediments to development that the free-flow advocates, and the law and finance theorists have
identified.
With a nod to the law and finance theorists, laws designed to support development should
introduce into a French-based system flexibility not dependent on the skill of lawyers, and
65

In the process, the endowment-theory researchers show that the French legal system may not be separately
correlated with lack of development. Compare id. at 1388 (asserting that French legal origin does not affect their
results) with La Porta et al., Law & Finance, supra note 7 at 1151-52, and Berkowitz et al., supra note 52 at 185-86
(acknowledging the correlation of French legal system to lack of development).
66

La Porta, Law & Finance, supra note 7 at 1139-40; But there are other apparent anomalies, such as the
suggestion that rich countries= laws are less friendly to investors than are the laws of less developed countries. Id. at
1139 (especially for creditors).
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provisions capable of sheltering commerce from extractive and authoritarian impulses.
Recognizing that the free-flow advocates= critique emphasizes the political nature of decisions to
erect barriers, the choice of internal legal system does not influence those decisions. Political
realities determine what linkages exist between economic and social development, and these can
be implemented whether private ordering is under a French legal system or a common law one.
Whatever its form, a transparent and predictable domestic legal system will not impede crossborder free flows more than the political authorities permit.
The prescription that the endowment theory identifies is even harder to discern with
confidence because we cannot change the past. However, efforts to reverse the
counterproductive norms inherited from the colonial era would be pro-growth. Thus,
encouraging longer-term investment would be helpful, as would other measures to reduce the
elites= extractive impulses. Adding protection of property, and specifically of investments, would
be favorable, too.67 Once again, the type of pre-existing legal system does not determine the
jurisdiction=s ability to develop economically.

II.

OHADA LAWS: DESIGN, CONTENT AND STRUCTURE, AND ENFORCEMENT
With these tasks in mind, we turn to OHADA, remembering that the OHADA founders=

articulated goal is to facilitate foreign investment for the purpose of enhancing local
development.68 OHADA laws are based on the French legal system.69 The last Part confirmed
67

See, e.g., Sachs, et al., supra note 10 at 164, and Stein, supra note 13 at 154-155 (acknowledging the
importance of investment to growth).
68

See supra note 6 (referring to President Kéba Mbaye and discussing OHADA=s avowed purpose of
increasing foreign investment).
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that the civil law system in general, and the French legal system in particular, can be compatible
with economic development. By analyzing specific provisions of the OHADA laws, we will see
that OHADA=s member-states have created a system of business laws uniquely designed to
enhance regional economic development.
Together, the comparative and development-economics lenses indicate the structures that
the OHADA legal regime must seek to provide if it is to enhance economic development. First,
OHADA must counter the authoritarian state, the rigid legal system, and the anti-private
property, extractive structures.70 That is the negative conclusion suggested by the comparative
analysis. Second, it must affirmatively provide a structure, in this case a legal structure, that
encourages investment, both domestic and foreign. This kind of structure is likely designed to
increase exports and lead to economic development. OHADA emphatically does not, however,
take a stand on the macroeconomic, political questions concerning, for example, the advisability
of the neoliberal vision of free trade as the source of economic growth. The OHADA laws focus
only on enhancing the predictability of business transactions, not on macroeconomic, political
decisions regarding barriers to goods or capital.
To ascertain whether the OHADA laws are supple rather than rigid, and whether they do
encourage investment, we will turn to its uniform act concerning corporations and other business
69

See, e.g., KONÉ, supra note 3 at 16 (noting OHADA=s similarlity to the French legal system). With
respect to the impact of transplanting, and thus the importance of studying a transplant in context, see generally Alan
Watson, Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 335, 339-40, 346-51 (1996) (discussing transplants); see
also Gunter Teubner, Legal Irritants; Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New
Divergences, 61 MODERN L. REV. 11, 14-32 (1998) (suggesting that a reception of law is more as an irritant than a
transplant).
70

See Beck et al., supra note 32 (without stipulating how to implement the recommendation, suggesting that
a country would improve its chances of developing economically if it were to Areform its approach to property rights,
private contracting, and free financial markets@).
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organizations. This is only one of many,71 but it is a reasonable stand-in for the others: the way it
addresses issues of corporate governance reflects assumptions about investment and, specifically,
about what categories of investors are to be encouraged. Within that statute, we will focus on the
most formal type of business association, the société anonyme, because less formal organizations
offer fewer corporate-law points of comparison.72 After that analysis, we will turn to concerns
about enforcement.

A.

OHADA CORPORATE LAW

Our review of the comparative law theories and of development economics indicated that
any corrective measure will have to protect private property and encourage capital formation in
the context of whatever economic regime the body politic adopts. Private ordering must be as
reliable as possible within the shadow of whatever political regime exists. Consider the
71

In addition to Acte Uniforme relatif au Droit des Sociétés Commerciales et du Groupment d=Intérêt
Economique, adopted April 17, 1997, 2 JO OHADA 1 (October 1, 1997) (Acorporate code@), the current OHADA
uniform acts are: Acte Uniforme relatif au Droit Commercial Général, adopted April 17, 1997, 1 Journal Officiel
(JO) OHADA 1 (October 1, 1997); Acte Uniforme portant Organisation des Sûretés, adopted October 1, 1997 [April
17, 1997], 3 JO OHADA 1 (October 1, 1997 [July 1, 1998]); Acte Uniforme, portant Organisation des Procédures
Simplifées de Recouvrement et des Voies d=Exécution, adopted April 10, 1998, 6 JO OHADA 1 (July [June] 1,
1998); Acte Uniforme, portant Organisation des Procédures Collectives d=Apurement du Passif, adopted April 10,
1998, 7 JO OHADA 1 (July 1, 1998); Acte Uniforme relatif au Droit de l=Arbitrage, adopted March 11, 1999, 8 JO
OHADA 2 (May 15, 1999); Acte Uniforme portant Organisation et Harmonisation des Compatibilités des
Entreprises, adopted February 22, 2000 [March 24, 2000], 10 JO OHADA 1 (Nov. 20, 2000). See
http://www.ohada.com/textes.php?PHPSESSID=f4b08a0fc3b774fad066419a02e2466a (last visited Jan. 27, 2005).
Also extant is Act uniforme relatif aux Contrats de Transport de Marchandises par Route, adopted March 22, 2003,
13 JO OHADA 3 (July 31, 2003). OHADA:TRAITE ET ACTES UNIFORMES COMMENTES ET ANNOTES, Joseph IssaSazegh, Paul-Gérard Pougoué / Filiga Michel Sawdogo, ed. (2d ed. 2000) (with 2003 addendum).
72

However, the most popular business form varies, as a practical matter, within the region. The
Groupement d=Intérêt Economique (GIE), partly for historical reasons, is favored in Senegal. Interviews with QN,
Dakar, June 24, 2004; Me.TT, Dakar, June 24, 2004 (notes on file with author). In the Côte d=Ivoire, the most
favored form is the Société à Responsabilité Limitée (SARL), and the GIE is limited to agricultural cooperatives as
was apparently originally intended. Interviews with TE, DL, QF, Abidjan, June 28, 2004; see also Interview with
Me. HT, Abidjan, June 28, 2004. The SARL is also the most common form in Cameroon. Interview with Me. BK,
Douala, July 5, 2004. This nation-to-nation inconsistency is problematic in the face of OHADA=s drive to
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investor=s non-market risks when investing in a corporation, whether public or private, and
whether the investor is foreign or domestic. First, there is the Berle and Means problem, the
agency costs that, according to Northern scholars, occur as soon as ownership is separated from
management.73 Second, there is the problem of conflicts among shareholders.74
OHADA corporate law addresses these issues on two levels. Its conception of corporate
social responsibility incorporates the behavior that its community expects of corporations.75
Corporate governance, the topic that has received a great deal of attention in recent years both in
the United States and in Europe, is essentially the implementation of the applicable principles of

uniformity. See infra part II.B.
73

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6-7
(1932) (discussing the importance of the separation of ownership from management). There is an argument that
French corporations are pre-Berle and Means because the French constitution stipulates that the state is to favor the
national community over private property, at least to the extent that both shareholders and managers are French.
However, as a practical matter, individual managers, even if French, will continue to have incentives to shirk and
otherwise steal. See Benjamin Mojuyé, French Corporate Governance in the New Millenium [sic]: Who Watches
the Board in Corporate France?, 6 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 73, 77-78, 110-111 (2000); see generally, Dickerson,
Ozymandias, supra note 29 160 n.143 (2003) (same).
74

For simplicity, the discussion will focus only on the société anonyme (SA), which is the classic
corporation. However, the OHADA statute offers a series of choices, including the société à responsabilité limitée
(SARL), which is part of the inspiration for the limited liability companies now authorized by state laws in the
United States. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Susan Pace Hamill, Michael L. Gravelle & Sharon Connaughton, The
Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 BUS. LAW. 375, 378 (1992) (noting the similarity
between limited liability companies and several European and Latin American analogies to the SARL); William
Callison, Venture Capital and Corporate Governance: Evolving the Limited Liability Company to Finance the
Entrepreneurial Business, 26 J. CORP. L. 97, 119 (2000) (mentioning specifically the SARL) I am focusing on the
SA because that allows me to discuss the publicly held business forms, but I recognize that non-corporate forms,
including the SARL are particularly well-suited to capital formation by indigenous entrepreneurs.
Outside the realm of corporate law, the investor is subject to other non-market risks, including an opposing
party=s refusal to pay. While OHADA laws cover this issue to some degree, it is not in addressed in the uniform act
on corporations and other business organizations, but instead, in the act on recovery of debts. See supra note 71
(listing the OHADA uniform acts).
75

See, e.g., Dickerson, Ozymandias, supra note 29 at 1052-60 (2003) (describing post-scandal reform
efforts in the US (post-Enron), the UK (post-Maxwell and post-Marconi), and in France (post-Marseille soccer club
and post-Alcatel Alsthorn)).
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corporate social responsibility.76 Thus, before delving into OHADA=s structure of corporate
governance, we must consider its conception of corporate social responsibility. Because it
provides an uncompromising perspective, the United States provides the point of comparison.

1.

Corporate Social Responsibility

In the United States, the classic articulation of corporate social responsibility belongs to
the Chicago-school, Nobel-winning economist, Milton Friedman. In 1970, he asserted that the
corporation=s social responsibility is to generate maximum profits legally possible for its
shareholders.77 To seek to do anything else amounts to taxation of the shareholders by corporate
management. Sometimes the effect is taxation of employees through depressed wages, or of
consumers through increased prices. Friedman asserts that managers should not spend corporate
property to accomplish what they perceive to be a social good. If they persist, they are
misapplying assets in order to achieve what the body politic demonstrably refused to do.78
Friedman=s claim that corporate management must focus on maximizing value for its
shareholders is completely consistent with the dominant view in the United States today: it
reflects recognition of Ashareholder primacy.@ Students of US corporation law may object that

76

See Jennifer Cook & Simon Deakin, Stakeholding and Corporate Governance: Theory and Evidence on
Economic Performance (July 1999) at 2, available at www. dti.gov.uk/cld/ersc1.pdf (last visited mar. 30, 2004).
77

Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE,
September 13, 1970 at 32 (Friedman speaks of profits, not shareholder value). Assuming that the securities markets
are informationally efficient, value and profit reduce to the same concept. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE
LAW 18 (1986). Another characterization is Ashareholder wealth maximization.@ See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, The
Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001) (citing
to Milton Friedman and referring to wealth maximization).
78

Friedman, supra note 77 at 33, 121-22, 124.
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there are many other schools of thought even in the United States concerning corporate social
responsibility, including the Progressives who have espoused a stakeholder concept.79 My point
is only that, to the extent that these alternative schools stray from the shareholder primacy model,
they are normative; as a purely descriptive matter the legal system in the United States is deeply
committed to shareholder primacy.80 Subject to some management discretion, the corporation is
supposed to generate maximum value for shareholders. That is the corporation=s social
responsibility.81
The shareholder primacy model certainly can help preserve the property that the owners
invest in corporations. It clarifies expectations by articulating that corporations should not
perform governmental functions. Of course, there is something circular about describing what
corporations should do, and then asserting that anything else is a forbidden, governmental action.
79

PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). Some might include the Team
Production Model as a variant of progressive corporate law, but it is about board supremacy as arbiter, and does not
predict how the directors would arbitrate. David Millon, New Game Plan or Business As Usual?, A Critique of the
Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001 (2000). Thus, the Team Production Model is more
about corporate governance than corporate social responsibility.
80

For example, when the media recently discussed Wal-Mart=s apparent abuse of undocumented workers,
the criticism was not articulated in terms of the corporation=s social responsibility to its stakeholder-employees.
Instead, the media focused on the fact that Wal-Mart=s violation of immigration laws by hiring undocumented
workers facilitated Wal-Mart=s further violation of labor and safety laws. That=s not a discussion of corporate social
responsibility that would assert, for example, a corporation=s duty, in its capacity as a corporation, to treat its workers
fairly (except, of course, to the extent that Wal-Mart=s search for profits even through illegal means would be
inconsistent with its responsibility to shareholders). Greg Schneider, Longtime Price Message Takes Back Seat to
Blitz Designed to Mend Reputation, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2004) at E01; available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A43156
- 2004Jan23?language=printer (downloaded Mar. 4, 2004)
81

In practice, the business judgment rule leaves directors a wide margin of acceptable behaviors, unless the
duty of loyalty is at issue, as in the case of hostile takeovers (Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, Co., 493 A.2d 946
(Del. S. Ct. 1985)) and, especially, a board decision to sell the company (Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. S. Ct. 1985)). The trends in the United Kingdom may be toward a middle course
between the U.S. perspective and the more stakeholder, French version described below. See Cynthia A. Williams &
John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way?: The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct,
CORNELL J. INT=L L. ___ (forthcoming 2005) (arguing that the U.K. has moved to a middle ground between the U.S.
and the Continent); see also Dickerson, Ozymandias, supra note 29 at 1055-58 (describing UK efforts at corporategovernance reform during the 1990s).
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As distinguished from the concept of shareholder primacy familiar to US lawyers and
increasingly to UK lawyers,82 France has adopted the concept of Aintérêt social@, or Acorporate
interest.@ Although a minority view asserts that this Acorporate interest@ is nothing more than the
individual and common interest of the owners, the majority view is expansive. With respect to
acts affecting the corporation=s assets, this understanding of Acorporate interest@ at minimum
includes not only the owners, but also the interest of the corporation as a whole, which in its turn
includes even third parties that have contracted with the corporation. The expansive
understanding of Acorporate interest@ may require management to consider, in addition to the
owners, the interests of employees, creditors, suppliers, clients, and perhaps even the State.83
The majority position has a tone that certainly is far more stakeholder than shareholder primacy.
The concept of Acorporate interest@ was already deeply embedded in the French corporate
law that preceded OHADA in most of the OHADA territory,84 and even at this early stage of the
OHADA regime=s existence, OHADA appears to have adopted the stakeholder sense of
Acorporate interest.@85 However, OHADA has not yet generated enough jurisprudence to reveal

82

See, e.g., Cook & Deakin, supra note 76 at 3 (discussing managers= responsibility to shareholders of UK
corporations).
83

See KONÉ, supra note 3 at 157-58 (discussing the three theories of intérêt social under French corporate
law). With respect to shareholders= voting rights, the application of intérêt social may be more restrained, with the
principle of equality of shares trumping. Even there, however, judges consider both the interest of the other
shareholders, and the interest of the corporation as a whole. Id. at 158.
84

See id. at 156 (discussing the state of the law in the OHADA territory starting in 1935).

85

See id. at 157-59 (suggesting that the concept of intérêt social may have become the Acompass@ for the
corporate operation in France, and that, although this is not yet certain, the OHADA regime may well share that
sensibility). See also FRANÇOIS ANOUKAHA, ABDOULLAH CISSE, NDIAW DIOUF, JOSETTE NGUEBOU TOUKAM,
PAUL-GÉRARD POUGOUE & MOUSSA SAMB, OHADA: SOCIÉTÉS COMMERCIALES ET G.I.E. 269 (2002) (hereinafter
SOCCOM) (discussing intérêt social in the context of abus de biens, and noting the French jurisprudence calling for
protection of third parties, as well as the owners and the Apatrimoine@ (Apatrimony@) of the corporation).
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whether Acorporate interest@ will ultimately embrace the full panoply of interested parties,
including the State. If it does so, the OHADA norm of corporate social responsibility would
presumably forbid environmental discrimination,86 and might well include affirmative
obligations to provide various services to those whom its operations affect. In any event, its
umbrella covers employees, many of whom will presumably be members of the local community.
Given OHADA=s purpose of promoting foreign investment in order to enhance the region=s
economic development, OHADA would be consistent with that goal if it were ultimately to adopt
a version of Acorporate interest@ that balances the perceived needs of potential investors with
those of the host region. The flexibility of the concept allows it to adjust its contours so as to be
consistent with the region=s evolving political assumptions concerning the best route to economic
growth.
The OHADA corporate law=s retention of the norm of Acorporate interest@ thus is our first
indication of the balance that the OHADA legislators sought. Specifically, they opted for a
concept responsive to local expectations, but one that already includes some guidelines. A
foreign investor might prefer shareholder primacy, depending on applicable factors; however, the
local government that includes not only elites that might invest, but also voters who may be
employees of the enterprise, might well prefer the stakeholder approach.87 The concept of

86

See, e.g., Edward Patrick Boyle, Note, It=s Not Easy Bein= Green: The Psychology of Racism,
Environmental Discrimination, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection Analysis, 46 VAND. L. REV.
937, 968 (1993) (succinctly describing the phenomenon, in the United States, of environmental discrimination).
87

The stakeholder norm may also be better suited to the host country=s cultural norms. That is another
study, but to the extent that regional norms in Africa support more community-based expectations than does the
United states= more individualistic approach, the Acorporate interest@ assumption may well better answer local needs
for that reason, too. See, e.g., MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC
SOCIETIES 3-5 (1925; translated by Ian Cunnison 1967) (emphasizing the importance of groups in Aprimitive@
societies, specifically relating to Aarchaic contracts@). But see KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE
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Acorporate interest,@ the focus on the highest interest of the corporation, may in addition
implicitly demand that a dominant shareholder not oppress the minority. In other words, this
concept describes an equitable perspective directly applicable to classic corporate governance.88
How, then, does OHADA translate its stakeholder understanding of corporate social
responsibility into action? How would a corporate-interest conception of corporate social
responsibility differ from a shareholder-primacy conception when seeking to protect private
property and, more generally, to encourage investment? Depending on local expectations, either
formula, can meet them. An indigenously grown conception of corporate social responsibility
will, by definition, conform to that society=s norms. Drawing with a broad brush, we can say that
the stockholder-primacy theme better suits the United States culture because it is consistent with
our admiration for rugged individualism.89 When transplanting a system, it is of course much
more difficult to determine whether corporate interest or shareholder primacy would be best
suited to, for example, the OHADA region.90 Anthropologists have disagreed on how to

CHEYENNE WAY, CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE 50-51 (1941) (pointing out that modern
society, like primitive ones, operates through groups).
88

Interview with Me. FB, Douala, Cameroon, July 5, 2004 (discussing Aintérêt social@).

89

ROBERT N. BELLAH, RICHARD MADSEN, WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANN SWIDLER & STEVEN M..TIPTON,
HABITS OF THE HEART 27-51 (1985) (considering a sociological perspective of individualism); ROBERT D. PUTNAM,
BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000) (discussing the disintegration of
community life in the United States).
90

See, e.g., Watson, Teubner, supra note 69 (discussing, respectively, Atransplants@ and Airritants@). See
also, Katharina Pistor & Daniel Berkowitz, Of Legal Transplants, Legal Irritants, and Economic Development, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL FLOWS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (P. K. Cornelius & B. Kogut, ed.) (2003)
347, 348-53, 361-62 (discussing irritants in the context of transplants into the developing world); Máximo Langer,
From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization
Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT=L L.J. 1, 29-35 (2004) (arguing that Atranslation@ is a better metaphor
than Atransplants@ or Airritants@).
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understand another culture=s legal norms.91 Nevertheless, I will hazard a fundamental
generalization for the purpose of discussion.
A formulation of corporate social responsibility that champions owners above all other
constituencies rather than valuing the entire community, may be more instinctive in a Western
culture than in an emerging economy still influenced by Aprimordial attachments@ and Aquasikinship@ obligations.92 I do not mean to overstate this generalization, either.93 Among other
complexities exists not only the reality of different attitudes within the developing world, but
also the fact that some Western countries are more community-minded than others.94 Although
OHADA-region scholars and practitioners well-versed in business law are keenly aware of the
corporate interest norm embedded in the OHADA corporate law, they have mixed views
regarding Acorporate interest.@ They do not reject the principle; they only question its
relevance.95 For example, no one I interviewed said the stakeholder approach was culturally

91

Compare Max Gluckman, Concepts in the Study of Tribal Law, in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 349-55,
371-73 ((Laura Nader ed. 1969; 1997) (comparing Bohannan=s use of local terms unfavorably to his own use of
Western analogues, while admiring Bohannan=s descriptive skill) with Paul Bohannan, Ethnography and
Comparison in Legal Anthropology, in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 401-18 (Laura Nader ed. 1969; 1997)
(complaining of Gluckman=s use of Western terms).
92

Clifford Geertz, The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States,
in OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES: THE QUEST FOR MODERNITY IN ASIA AND AFRICA (Clifford Geertz, ed. 1963) at
109, 112.
93

For an indication of the complexity, see Keith Hart, The Social Anthropology of West Africa, 14 ANN.
REV. ANTHROPOL. 243 (1985) (reviewing studies of the region and noting the disjuncture caused by colonialism and
independence).
94

See, e.g., MAUSS, supra note 87 at 65 (describing the rise of collectivism in France during the 20th century
inter bellum).
95

See supra text accompanying notes 82-88 (discussing Aintérêt social@ under French law, and considering
its status under OHADA law). See also Interview with Me. FB, supra note 88 (rejecting relevance of Acorporate
interest@). However, I also visited a company in Buéa, Cameroon operated in a manner consistent with the highest
level of corporate interest. Academics displayed mixed reactions. Compare Interview on June 30, 2004 with Prof.
Anne-Marie Assi-Esso, founder of a law school in Abidjan, Côte d=Ivoire, the Ecole Supérieure Internationale de
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inappropriate. Instead, for the practical-minded, clarity of terms and predictability of judgmentexecution are more urgent issues.96 The dispute between the two principles was in effect
dismissed by many as luxury in which only developed economies can indulge.
One academic, however, actually embraced the concept of corporate interest, stating
explicitly that it can help prevent abuse.97 Because the principle of corporate interest is broad
enough to conform to many cultures, it will be interesting to see how it evolves in the OHADA
region;98 as we shall see, the OHADA laws are adopted by a process that includes local input.99
At minimum, Acorporate interest@ is a concept that, in France, has been compatible with
economic success,100 and that should be flexible enough to support many perspectives, not just
the classic, neoliberal view. Thus, it is at worst neutral, and may be favorable to economic
growth, especially if the political interests do call for linking investment to social as well as

Droit (rejecting Acorporate interest@ as irrelevant to the business realities in the region) with Interview with Vice
Rector and Prof. Paul-Gérard Pougoué, Soa, Cameroon, July 9, 2004 (suggesting that the principle of Acorporate
interest@ can serve as a means of avoiding abuse).
96

Interview with Me. FB supra note 88 (rejecting relevance of Acorporate interest@); Interview with Prof.
Assi-Esso, supra note 95 (rejecting Acorporate interest@ as irrelevant to the business realities in the region).
97

Interview with Prof. Pougoué, supra note 95 (suggesting that the principle of Acorporate interest@ can
serve as a means of avoiding abuse; Prof. Pougoué did not describe the type of abuse that he believed could be
attenuated but from the context, he may have been referring to managers= abuse of corporate power in their dealings
with the corporations= various constituencies).
98

The principle of Acorporate interest@ may create additional risks to a fragile judicial environment. Because
it is more of a standard than a rule, its application depends on judges= exercise of discretion. To give judges
discretion is to increase the risk of corruption. See Interview with Prof. Pougoué, supra note 95 (noting that the
danger of corporate interest is that it provides discretion to judges).
99

See infra part II.B.1.c (discussing OHADA=s legislative branch, the Council of Ministers).

100

See La Porta et al., Law & Finance, supra note 7 at 1151-52 (describing France as a Avery rich
countr[y]@).
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economic impacts.101

2.

Corporate Governance

a. Berle & Means: Separation of ownership and management. In addition to standards
such as the Acorporate interest@, the OHADA corporate statute also imposes many rules that limit
management behavior. Many of these rules will be utterly unsurprising to a common-law lawyer:
management is not supposed to indulge in conflict transactions, so loans from the corporation
are, for example, forbidden.102 And, importantly in the context of transparency, management is
supposed to keep the shareholders informed.103 How the concept of corporate interest is
implemented reveals whether OHADA is flexible and supports property rights against the state
and extractive elites.104
To be sure, individual implementing provisions may be relatively unfamiliar to the
Anglo-American lawyer. Thus we must consider them in the context of the entire unfirom act
concerning business organizations.
Turning first to management=s obligation to inform the owners, OHADA law requires that
any corporation must have a statutory auditor.105 This is not a trivial protection: it was such an

101

See Ocampo, supra note 4 at 100-01 (with respect to developing countries, advocating linkages of
economic and social development, and identifying Ahuman development@as a goal).
102

SOCCOM, supra note 85 at 271 (concerning conflicts of interest generally), and 422 & 430 (noting that
managers cannot borrow from the corporation, with very few exceptions).
103

See generally SOCCOM, supra note 85 at 79-80, 462-63 (describing the shareholders= rights to receipt of
information from managers). Id. at 169 (noting that an S.A. must have a commissaire aux comptes).
104

See supra Introduction to Part II.

105

The reference, as usual in this discussion, is to an SA. See SOCCOM, supra note 85 at 449 (noting also
that even SARLs must appoint a statutory auditor if they exceed a specified fairly small size in annual sales of 250
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auditor who first unmasked Messier=s excesses at Vivendi Universal.106 Twice a year,
shareholders may also demand that management reveal any information that could have a
significant, negative financial impact.107
While some of these provisions may seem needlessly formal, they may be particularly
important in a developing economy. Especially in the United States, the oft-repeated assertion is
that, at least for public corporations, the markets place important constraints on managers.108
However, in economies that tend not to have widely dispersed share ownership and thus are not
susceptible to hostile takeovers for example, some of the developed-country market constraints
are not available as a practical matter.109 This formalism therefore should be reassuring to
investors, both domestic and foreign, because it may enhance transparency and predictability in
an environment where legal sophistication is relatively hard to come by.

million fr. CFA (164K i) or in number of employees employees (50)).
106

See Dickerson, Ozymandias, supra note 29 at 1047 (discussing the Vivendi Universal melt-down and the
role of the accounting firm, Salustro-Reydel); Ennuis Judiciaires en Vue pour les Deux Rivaux, LA TRIBUNE (Oct.
30, 2002), available at
http://www.latribune.fr/Dossiers/vivendi.nsf/(LookupPrint)/IDC1256B2E0034D352C1256C62007A99C5?OpenDoc
ument (downloaded Mar. 30, 2004) (identifying Salustro-Reydel as Vivendi=s Acommissaire aux comptes@ (statutory
auditor) at the relevant time).
107

See SOCCOM, supra note 85 at 449.

108

For a summary of certain market restraints on managers of US public corporations, see, e.g., Manuel A.
Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 540, 554-56 (1995).
109

See Ajit Singh, The New International Financial Architecture, Corporate Governance and Competition
in Emerging Markets: Empirical Anomalies and Policy Issues in RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS (Ha-Joon
Chang, ed. 2003) at 377, 391 (also noting that countries such as France have effectively constrained their managers
by means other than hostile takeovers). This last point is particularly interesting given that the OHADA legal regime
is heavily based on French law. The limitations on US-style market constraints exist, of course, whenever the
markets are less liquid and diversified than in the US. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate
Governance in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH (Klaus
J. Hopt, Kideki Kanda, Mark J. Roe, Eddy Wymeersch & Stefan Prigge eds. 1998) at 701, 716-17 (asserting that
public disclosure is a more effective constraint on managers in the US, as opposed to Japan or Germany).
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In other ways, the OHADA statute has opted for simplicity rather than any other value.
Reformers in France, and for that matter reformers in the United Kingdom and the United States
with greater success, have called for Aindependent@ directors, that is, persons who have no
substantial relationship with the corporation other than as director.110 The OHADA statute, on
the other hand, seems to assume that it may be too difficult to find independent directors and
that, in any event, even if a new broom sweeps clean, the old one knows all the corners. There is
some justification for OHADA=s agnosticism on the subject of independent directors, as several
scholars have persuasively questioned their usefulness in enhancing a firm=s economic
performance.111 OHADA=s response is both pragmatic and balanced: although OHADA-region
directors must be non-conflicted, they need not be Aindependent.@
Reformers in the North have been very leery of allowing too much power to concentrate
in the hands of a single manager or group of managers.112 Nevertheless, again presumably in the
interest of simplicity, the OHADA statute does not provide for splitting the board into a
110

See, e.g., See Dickerson, Ozymandias, supra note 59 at 1052-60 (reporting that the UK=s reforms
champion non-executive directors, and that the US and French reforms call for increased use of independent
directors). See also Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, supra note 9 at 28 (noting that developing countries are different, that
French law requires contractual sophistication at least concerning organizational forms, and that, consequently,
simplicity is better).
111

See, e.g., Sanjai Baghat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation between Board Independence and LongTerm Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002) (showing that in the US, independent directors have little
effect); see also Julian Franks et al., Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies?, ' 3.4 (Centre
for Econ. Pol'y Research, Discussion Paper No. 2949, 2001) (discussing the importance of the endgame in the UK).
112

See, e.g., Deborah Solomon, SEC to Approve Governance Rules by NYSE, Nasdaq, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13,
2003) (reporting that the proposals to be voted on by the SEC require a majority of independent directors, and
regular meetings of nonmanagement directors, for all corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange or
Nasdaq). UK: The Combined Code, Principles of Good Governance and of Best Practice, ' 1(A)(1-3) (2000)
(mandating the board to be effective, separate chairman from CEO, and balance between NEDs and executive
directors), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/lr_comcode.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2003). France: see
Dickerson, Ozymandias, supra note 29 at 1059 (discussing the two-tier board option in France, and the Viénot 1999
report=s suggestion that, if the Président and Directeur-Général positions are held by the same person, the board
clearly articulate the extent of the powers of the APDG@).
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supervisory board and a management board. It does not stipulate separation of the role of the
Chairman of the Board from that of the chief executive officer (CEO).113 It even affirmatively
requires that, if there are three or fewer shareholders, a single Administrator-General will serve
as Chairman of the Board and CEO, and even as the board itself.114 The purpose for this last
provision is to add flexibility to the standard corporate form, the société anonyme, in the interest
of attracting foreign investment.115
b. Relationships between and among shareholders. With respect to the relationship
among shareholders, it is useful to remember that there are public shareholders in the OHADA
territory. The regional stock market, located in the Côte d=Ivoire, lists just under forty
companies, and had a capitalization of US$1.3 billion in 2003.116 It is interesting, but probably
not surprising, that the stock market is located in a country that has at least a small bourgeoisie.
While most listed companies are majority-held by foreign investors, Ivorian shareholdings
represent very close to half the capitalization.117 Although the market has not been a major
source of capital for new ventures, it has been an important forum where foreign and domestic
113

See SOCCOM, supra note 85 at 425-29 (discussing the roles of the Président (Chairman), of the Directeur
Général (CEO) and of the Président Directeur Général).
114

See, id. at 429-31.

115

Id. at 429. The most used form is the SARL or the GIE, depending on the particular state-member of
OHADA. See also Interviews with QN, Me. TT, TE, DL, QF, Me. HT and Me. BK, supra note 72.
116

With this market valuation, the entire market would be around number 450 on Fortune 500. See
http://www.fortune.com/fortune/fortune500/company/top500/0,17354,401,00.html (downloaded Oct 15, 2003). For a
description of the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières (BRVM), see
http://www.mbendi.co.za/exch/25/p0005.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
117

See Kathryn C. Lavelle, Architecture of Equity Markets: The Abidjan Regional Bourse, 55 INT=L ORG.
717, 718, 728, 735 (2001) (reporting that non-West Africans Acontrol an overwhelming percentage of the publicly
listed firms@; that the Côte d=Ivoire had developed a Asmall bourgeoisie@; and that AIvoriens [sic] hold 49.4 percent of
total market capitalization@).
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capital can meet. The stock market appears to have been a vehicle through which governments
have effected the privatization demanded by international financial institutions.118 Thus, while
the stock market may have evolved because of the adherence of international financial
institutions to neoliberal norms, it remains a structure that could play an important future role in
generating both domestic and foreign capital. OHADA=s legislators have taken this into account
by providing a statute that applies both to public and to private companies.
The principal standard applicable to relations among shareholders under the OHADA
corporate statute is a prohibition against abuse by either the majority or the minority.119 Given
that foreigners tend to hold a majority of public companies, but that domestic shareholders
already have significant holdings, this balance indicates that the OHADA project seeks to protect
owners= investments, whether the investors are foreign or domestic, and whatever the level of
their holdings. Thus, OHADA encourages foreign investment while simultaneously sheltering
domestic participation in capitalizing businesses.120
Along with applicable standards, there are many rules, of course. Two that also reflect
the balance the OHADA drafters have sought but that may surprise foreigners are preemptive
rights and a double-vote provision.121 Preemptive rights are still popular in France;122 in contrast,
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See, id. at 723, 730 (discussing developing countries= use of illiquid stock markets as a way to comply
with the IFIs= demands for privatization). The BRVM became truly regional in 1998, when the Senegalese company,
Sonatel, was privatized. See, id. at 734 (discussing Sonatel).
119

See SOCCOM, supra note 85 at 77-78, 187 (discussing the principle of equality among shares, and the
illegality of abuse, meaning essentially self-serving behavior, not justified by Al=intérêt de la société@, by either the
majority or the minority).
120

See supra this Part II.A.2.b.

121

See SOCCOM, supra note 85 at 464 (preemptive rights) and 77, 460-61 (double vote).

122

See Dickerson, Ozymandias, supra note 29 at 1044-45 (noting that preemptive rights are more common
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they have for the most part disappeared from corporate practice in the United States, where they
are seen as limiting management=s ability to raise capital, especially as shareholdings become
more widely dispersed and the mechanics of exercising these rights thus more cumbersome.123
Basically, when preemptive rights exist, they allow shareholders to retain their existing
percentage of ownership in the face of a new issuance of shares. If the shareholder now holds
twenty percent, it can buy up to twenty percent of the new issue at the issue price. Given that
foreign shareholders currently hold a majority position in most public companies and thus control
them, the preemptive rights tend to protect the domestic minority shareholders. The drafters
must have assumed that companies would succeed in raising needed new capital, whether from
the originally targeted sources, or from existing shareholders that exercise their preemptive
rights.
The drafters may also have considered that the minority (usually domestic) shareholders
should at minimum be allowed to participate even if those shareholders typically do not possess
enough capital to stay in for many rounds. Further, the negative aspects of preemptive rights are
far less salient where even public companies= shareholdings are not widely distributed. Finally,
the drafters doubtless realized that in closely held businesses, the majority holder could well be
Ivoirian. Thus, the OHADA states-members adopted a corporate law that offers a reasonable

in France than in the US; indeed, Vivendi Universal had such a provision).
123

See, e.g., Lori A. Dawkins, Note, Shareholders= Preemptive Rights in West Virginia, 97 W.VA. L. REV.
437, 439041 (1993). The issue is the same today, as evidenced by events toward the end of Jean-Marie Messier=s
tenure as PDG of Vivendi Universal. He had requested that the shareholders approve a repeal of preemptive rights
in order to simplify the company=s task of raising capital; the shareholders refused. Richard Verrier, Michael A.
Hiltzik, & Sallie Hofmeister, Messier Faces His Critics at Meeting; Media: Vivendi Universal Shareholders Veto a
Stock-Otpion Plan for Management But OK Firing of Pierre Lescure, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2002) at C1, 2002 WL
2471233.
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balance between foreign and domestic interests and a reasoned recognition of local realities.
As to the double-voting rights, OHADA corporate law provides that shareholders who
have held shares for at least two years in their own names, not in bearer form, can be awarded
double voting rights.124 As a point of comparison the average U.S. investor holds investments
7.8 years.125 Like preemptive rights, double-voting rights are an artifact of French law.126 While
it is not clear whether this provision benefits foreign investors or domestic ones, its retention
serves to encourage early investment and to preserve the status quo.127 Thus, in the OHADA
region, double voting rights seek to rectify an aspect of pre-OHADA law criticized by the
comparative lens:128 they support stability and discourage a cut-and-run, extractive approach to
investment.129

B.

OHADA PRAGMATIC REACH: ENFORCEMENT

OHADA law may be balanced and sophisticated, and it may be particularly suited to

124

See, SOCCOM, supra note 85 at 77, 460-61 (discussing double vote, and the 2-year, nominal-holding
requirement).
125

Adam Ritt, Who Is the American Shareholder? Voice of the American Shareholder, BETTER INVESTING
MAGAZINE, NAIC (January 2004), available at www.better-investingnewsroom.org/voice/Voic-164.htm (last visited
Jan. 22, 2005) (reporting Harris Interactive poll results).
126

See, e.g, L=Association Notariale de Paris 12, Le Gouvernement d=Entreprise, available at
http://dessnotaire.free.fr/exposes/legouvernementdentreprise.htm (last visted Apr. 2, 2004) (referring to French law
and plural voting rights).
127

*Le Gouvernement d=Entreprise, http://dessnotaire.free.fr/exposes/legouvernementdentreprise.htm
(downloaded Oct 3, 2003) (suggests that pre-NRE, weighted voting is possible; less clear post-NRE; check L 22525).
128

See, supra Part I.B (discussing the comparative lens).

129

There are also provisions to protect bondholders and other creditors. See, SOCCOM, supra note 85 at 470-

479.
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encourage both foreign and domestic investment; however, it will not be effective unless it is
enforced. There are two aspects to this problem of enforcement. The threshold assumption of
OHADA=s founders is that a harmonized, modern system of business laws will enhance the
territory=s economic development, in part by making the region attractive to foreign
investment.130 For these purposes Aharmonization@ is no flimsy concept: the process creates truly
uniform business laws throughout the OHADA territory.131 Even if there is enforceability, a
variation from state to state will weaken the nations= ability to define their own norms, and to
then impose them on foreign investors. If each member state of OHADA can interpret the laws
at the national level, the effort to attract foreign investment can become a race to the bottom. For
example, an OHADA member-state could choose to retreat from the balanced treatment
described in the prior section and, instead, favor majority shareholders in the hopes of reassuring
the foreigners. Because OHADA laws are harmonized (uniform), they do not facilitate or
otherwise encourage this kind of divisive behavior.132
From a different, more positive perspective, persons trading among or into OHADA
130

See, e.g., LeBoulanger, supra note 2: AL=objectif du Traité et des institutions qu=il a mises en place est,
selon les auteurs, ambitieux: il s=agit, d=une part de promouvoir un droit des affaires moderne et unique, susceptible
de mettre un terme à l=insécurité juridique résultant de la vétusté dans de nombreux pays et de la disparité des
législations nationales en la matière, d=autre part de lutter contre l=insécurité judiciaire dont la cause essentielle réside
dans le manque chronique de moyens des juridictions nationales, en créant un environnement favorable au
développement des échanges commerciaux et des investissements.@ A professor at the Ivoirian University of
Cocody=s law school, who also was serving as a deputy to the national assembly, commented favorably on that
assumption. See Lohoues-Oble, supra note 2 at 544 -45.
131

See LeBoulanger, supra note 2 at 546-47 (presuming that the term Aharmonisation@ was used for
diplomatic reasons, but emphasizing that the OHADA business laws are truly unified). See also KONÉ, supra note 3
at 4-5 (discussing the difference between the European Union=s harmonization of laws, and the OHADA regime=s
unification and uniformity of laws). Of course, uniformity is not a panacea because uniformity in a bad direction is
bad. See, e.g., Steven Walt, Novelty and the Risks of Uniform Sales Law, 39 VA. J. INT=L L. 671, 672 (1999) (noting
that, perversely, uniformity can accentuate inefficient effects).
132

Because OHADA offers business laws but is not a customs union, OHADA does not limit the memberstates; ability to establish independent trade policy, for example.
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member-states will have lower transaction costs if they need not worry about national variations,
thereby encouraging trade.133 The second step is that these uniformly interpreted laws must be
enforced. We will look first at the interpretation problem and then briefly at enforcement.
1.

Uniform Interpretation through Supranational Structures

The simple adoption of uniform laws is a relinquishment of sovereignty contemplated by
the OHADA treaty: a law that OHADA adopts is automatically and immediately an internal law
of each of OHADA=s member-states.134 To accept a uniform interpretation and enforcement
represents another significant step in the same direction. At this point, it is worth pausing to
consider why national elites would have allowed the OHADA project to exist at all. The answer
is fraught with speculation, but a legal professional who is from the OHADA territory and who
was deeply involved at OHADA=s earliest stages indicates that the political leaders in the region
really did understand OHADA to be pro-development and had been deeply worried by the
economic downturn of the early 1990s.135 It may also be that the elites recognized that the
OHADA laws= nuanced balancing act protects the elites. Elites may typically be majority

133

That, of course, was the logic behind the uniform laws in the United States, and the UN Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 10, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, Annex I, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. These are only business laws
relating to private ordering, thus they do not prevent a government from imposing on trade whatever social or
economic linkages its political system prefers. See also supra note 132 (specifically mentioning the freedom of each
OHADA member-states to establish independent trade policies).
134

See OHADA Treaty, Art. 10 (explicitly stating that the uniform acts adopted pursuant to the treaty are
directly and mandatorily applicable in the member-states). The CCJA has explicitly ruled that the OHADA Treaty
abrogates national laws that contrary to, and even merely identical with, the OHADA laws. See KONÉ, supra note 3
at 5 (describing two rulings of the CCJA, one in response to a request by the Ivoirian government, and the other as a
result of the court=s review of an intra-State arbitration). For scholarly recognition that OHADA implicates at least a
limited waiver of sovereignty, see Forneris, supra note 1 at 9-10.
135

Interview with Pres. Kéba Mbaye, Dakar, June 25, 2004. See also supra note 2 & 68 (referring to the
articulated goal of OHADA, viz., increasing foreign investment).
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holders in domestic investments, but we have seen that they tend to have minority positions when
foreign investors are involved.136 A neutral law can protect their own holdings in both
circumstances.
The other reason why the national elites, including the national governments, accepted the
relinquishment of sovereign authority is almost certainly because of the manner in which the
OHADA drafters structured the new regime. As we will see, it is the triumph of structure and
procedure, deployed in the service of substance. OHADA is not just a system of uniform laws; it
is a unified legal system designed to protect and enhance the pro-investment qualities of the
OHADA laws. It accomplishes this by erecting an entire legislative and judicial structure that
formulates and interprets the OHADA laws, and prepares them for enforcement.
a. CCJA. The OHADA Treaty awards the interpretive function to the ACour Commune
de Justice et d=Arbitrage@ (the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration), commonly known as
the CCJA. This court is a complete judicial system that is supranational within the OHADA
territory and operates parallel to the national systems. The CCJA has two principal roles with
respect to the business laws adopted under OHADA: it offers a forum for international arbitrage,
and it also serves as the court of last resort for judgments rendered and arbitrations instituted
within State-members.137 Its role as forum for international arbitrage remains undeveloped, in
part because of significant competition from both governmental138 and non-governmental
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Lavelle, supra, note 117. See also supra part II.A.2.b.

137

See, e.g., LeBoulanger, supra note 2 at 551 (concerning the CCJA=s dual roles). See also infra note 140
(discussing the extent of, and limitations on, the CCJA=s supranational authority).
138

Interview with Pres. Dr. François Komoin, Abidjan, June 29, 2004 (referring to the arbitral court of the
Côte d=Ivoire, located in Abidjan).
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groups.139 Its role as final arbiter is its contribution to effective uniformity.
Because the CCJA preserves the uniformity of the OHADA laws through its final say,140
it truly represents a transfer of indicia of national sovereignty to a supranational authority.141 No
matter where the cause of action arises, if the CCJA has jurisdiction over the matter, the Treaty
requires the national supreme courts to forward the case to the CCJA located in Abidjan, Côte
d=Ivoire.142 This ensures that any decisions under the OHADA laws will occur outside the
existing, often authoritarian and extractive national institutions, a significant concept in
development-talk.143
This is not to say that the role of the CCJA even as interpreter of OHADA laws is yet
139

Interview with Mr. SADJO Ousmanou, in Douala, Cameroon, on July 6, 2004 (discussing the arbitral
procedures of the Groupement Inter-patronal du Cameroun (GICAM), an association of employers).
140

See LeBoulanger, supra note 2 at 551. The CCJA=s rule as court of last resort with respect to intra-State
arbitrations is as a court of cassation (it cannot modify a lower tribunal=s decision, but it can reject it). See Forneris,
supra note 1 at 3. A limitation on the CCJA=s authority is that it cannot impose penal sanctions; that is the role of the
individual States. OHADA Treaty, art. 5. See also Issa-Sayegh, Intégration, supra note 1 (discussing the penalsanction limitation, and suggesting a reform to wholly remove any penal authority from the CCJA). See also
SOCCOM, supra note 85 at 232-38 (discussing penal sanctions in the context of corporate law, specifically).
Another way in which the CCJA assists in establishing uniform business laws, is by advising the legislative
branch, the Conseil des Ministres. See, e.g., BUSLAW, supra note 1 at 13. For a discussion of the Conseil des
Ministres, see infra, Part II.B.1.c.
141

The CCJA has explicitly ruled that the OHADA Treaty abrogates national laws that are contrary to, and
even merely identical with, the OHADA laws. See KONÉ, supra note 3 at 5 (describing two rulings of the CCJA, one
in response to a request by the Ivoirian government, and the other as a result of the court=s review of an intra-State
arbitration). For scholarly recognition that OHADA implicates at least a limited waiver of sovereignty, see Forneris,
supra note 1at 9-10.
142

See email communication with Me. TT (Aug. 9, 2004; on file with author) (interpreting the jurisdiction of
the CCJA to cover questions concerning the application of OHADA laws, instead of all disputes to be decided
pursuant to OHADA laws); but see email communication from Prof. Joseph Issa-Sayegh (Oct. 9, 2004; on file with
author) (stating that the CCJA=s jurisdiction includes both interpretation and application of the OHADA uniform
acts, but noting the difficulty when more than one legal system is involved in a single cause of action).
143

For a suggestion that a national judicial system may be coopted, at least in part by political forces, see
Amnesty International, Press Release (Jan. 26, 2004), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/FRAAFR310012004 (downloaded Mar. 30, 2004) (describing allegations of
human rights abuses that the Côte d=Ivoire has not investigated despite the government=s promise in the Jan. 24, 2003
Linas-Marcoussis peace agreement).
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fully settled. National supreme courts are jealous of their authority. Justices are concerned that
they will not have enough work, or at least not enough interesting work, if all matters relating to
commerce pass directly from the national appellate courts to the CCJA, thus by-passing the
national supreme courts entirely.144 If the CCJA does have this overarching role as many who
have studied the OHADA Treaty believe, then the CCJA will indeed be able to protect the laws=
uniformity. What is factually obvious, however, is that the national supreme courts are in fact
not sending all their business-related cases to the CCJA, and the parties apparently often do not
insist that their case be removed. The supreme courts= motivation is clear enough; legal
professionals within the region confirm that parties are equally reticent due to the perceived cost
of removing the final appeal to the CCJA in Abidjan.145 The fact that the vast majority of appeals
to the CCJA come from the Côte d=Ivoire supports that conclusion.146
Until the OHADA structure finds a way to reassure non-Ivoirians on the expense front, it
will be unlikely that the CCJA will play the fullest possible role in support of uniformity. Added
to this possible practical impediment to full realization of the CCJA is a problem created by the
text. Certain legal professionals suggest that the Treaty gives the CCJA jurisdiction only to hear

144

Interview with Pres Seydou BA, president of the CCJA, in Abidjan on June 29, 2004 (noting that he has
good relations with the supreme court of Côte d=Ivoire); Interview with Pres. Kouassi Kouadio, Magistrate, in
Abidjan on June 29, 2004 (stating that the Côte d=Ivoire=s supreme court perceives itself to be the only one to refer
cases to the CCJA).
145

Interview with Me. HT, supra note 72 (noting that non-Ivorian supreme courts within the OHADA
territory ignore the CCJA); interview with Lord Justice Fonkwe J.F., in Yaoundé, Cameroon, on July 9, 2004
(indicating that, presumably, some supreme courts fail to refer cases to the CCJA for fear of losing the more
interesting cases).
146

Interview with Pres Ba, supra note 144 (asserting that 90% of CCJA cases come from Ivorian parties; he
suspects that if two parties are from the same country other than Côte d=Ivoire, they will take their case to their own
supreme court).
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questions of interpretation, not all matters having arisen under OHADA laws.147 If that is the
case, the CCJA will still have a significant role to play in maintaining uniformity, but only at a
remove. That is, after a national court has adopted a particular interpretation and rendered a
decision, the CCJA would finally have its opportunity to review the interpretationBbut only if a
national government or a party were to call on the CCJA to announce the definitive
understanding.
b. ERSUMA. Another structure that OHADA has established is a regional school, the
Ecole Régionale Supérieure de la Magistrature, which is designed to educate the legal
professionals of the OHADA territory. This institution reinforces norms as it imparts substantive
legal knowledge.148 OHADA even publishes cases and provides legal texts; before the advent of
OHADA lawyers and even judges could remain ignorant of the status of entire bodies of law,
including the bankruptcy-law regime.149 The principal criticism of OHADA=s education mission
is that it does not have the resources to do enough. In anglophone Cameroon, for example, many
sitting judges did not know about OHADA until after the first OHADA laws were already in
effect. The judges were furious and embarrassed to have learned about OHADA for the first
time not from the government or from OHADA, but rather from counsel pleading a case.150
c. Conseil des Ministres (Council of Ministers). The OHADA structure is a brilliant

147

See Me. TT email, supra note 142 (asserting that the CCJA=s jurisdiction is limited to interpretation).
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See generally, BUSLAW, supra note 1at 16-17 (noting that a purpose of the school is to promote the use
of the OHADA regime of business laws).
149

See Forneris, supra note 1at 7-8 (reporting that a judge had vaguely remembered a bankruptcy law from
twenty years before, but did not know what its current status was).
150

Interview with Mrs. FON ACHU Helen, Magistrate, Douala, Cameroon, July 7, 2004.

45

Draft 031605

coup, both as a conceptual and as a procedural matter. In fairness, however, it is not without
moral difficulty. Specifically, anyone who moderates from a purely universalist position will
recognize that the OHADA system is aggressively top-down, and that it inserts an aggressively
Western/Northern legal system.
The OHADA drafters assert that OHADA enhances pre-OHADA business law by
updating texts, some of which were more than a century old, and most of which had not been
reviewed post-independence.151 The member-states of OHADA wanted a Western/Northern
system, not a customary or traditional one, for the more complex commercial transactions that
they wished to facilitate. They believe that foreign investors will be more comfortable with an
essentially familiar system; in all likelihood, it would substantially reduce transaction costs.152
The OHADA proponents also point out that the decision to adopt the OHADA system has been

151

There were exceptions, but among the OHADA member-states, only Senegal, Guinea and Mali attempted
a systematic review of business laws between independence and the OHADA Treaty in 1993. See KONÉ, supra note
3 at 10-11 (noting that the primary corporate law was based on French laws of 1867).
152

See supra note 2 and the introduction to Part II (concerning the drafters= effort to reduce investors=
transaction costs). See also Undated Interview with Judge Kéba Mbaye, one of three members of the original
drafting committee (ADirectoire@), http://www.afrology.com/eco/kebam.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2005; first read
Sept. 22, 2003): A[L]es entrepreneurs m'ont répondu, partout, pratiquement la même chose : >Nous ne voulons pas
investir parce que nous ne connaissons pas quel est le droit qui va régir notre patrimoine. Vous allez dans un pays,
vous demandez quel est le droit qui vous permet de créer aujourd'hui une société anonyme, personne ne le sait. Il y a
pire. Une fois que nous arrivons à détecter, dans certains pays, quel est le droit applicable pour la création de notre
entreprise, pour sa viabilité et, au cas où surviendrait un jour un différend, pour la manière dont ce différend doit être
réglé, nous avons toujours des surprises considérables. Le même droit n'est pas applicable d'un pays à un autre, d'un
tribunal à un autre. On ne tient pas compte de la jurisprudence. Et, généralement, nous sommes toujours les victimes
de cette situation, c'est ce qui explique notre hésitation à continuer à investir.= C'est alors que j'ai utilisé l'expression
qui a eu ensuite une certaine fortune : >en réalité, ce qui empêche les investissements, c'est l'insécurité juridique et
judiciaire.= @
Some critical theorists question the existence of Atraditional@ cultures and of Amodernity@, pointing out that
these concepts are matters of perspective, and suggesting that a better approach to understanding what is necessary to
a region=s development is to establish a dialogue. See, e.g., Vincent Tucker, The Myth of Development: A Critique
of a Eurocentric Discourse, in CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A NEW PARADIGM (Ronaldo
Munck & Denis O=Hearn, eds., 1999) at 1, 8-9, 17-21.
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legitimated by democratic procedure.153 The national parliaments approved the 1993 treaty, and
the national governments still play a consultative role in the creation of new OHADA laws.154
Admittedly less democratic is the fact that the OHADA legislative body, the Conseil des
Ministres (the Council of Ministers), is composed of Justice and Finance Ministers and thus is at
least one step removed from the electorate.155 And the national structures that have adopted the
entire system, including the parliaments, manifest varying levels of democratic participation,
depending on the particular country.156
This non-democratic aspect is a weakness of the OHADA structure as confirmed by the
desirable factors identified by our review of comparative law. A pro-investment structure must
protect propertyBa mission the OHADA laws and structure appear ready to accomplishBbut it
must also shelter commercial transactions from local extractive impulses. On the latter issue, the
Treaty=s delegation of the legislative role to senior officials of the national governments looks
like a very pragmatic trade-off: the governments approved a treaty that restricts national
sovereignty through legislation, in exchange for some direct governmental control over that
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See Berkowitz et al., supra note 52 at 188-90 (asseting the importance of voluntary receipt of a legal
system, and in particular of adapting that system to the host locale=s social and economic environment).
154

OHADA Treaty, arts. 6 & 7 (calling for Aconcertation avec les gouvernements des Etats parties@, and also
advice from the CCJA, before the Conseil des Ministres approves a uniform law). Most of the States-members have
set up a committed made up of Arepresentatives from their legal and judicial professions, the academia, line
ministries and parliament.@ Forneris, supra note 1at 11.
155

See, e.g., BUSLAW, supra note 1 at 8.

156

For 2004, Freedom House ranked three OHADA countries as Afree,@ six as Apartly free,@ and seven as
Anot free.@ See Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2005, Table of Independent Countries, Comparative
Measures of Freedom, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2005/table2005.pdf
(downloaded Mar. 4, 2005) (listing countries= performance from Dec. 1, 2003 through Nov. 30, 2004; the measures
are based on an assessment of Apolitical rights@ and Acivil liberties@). Senegal was listed as Afree,@ but Cameroon and
Côte d=Ivoire were Anot free.@ Id.
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legislation. More to the point, as a practical matter the cost in lost democracy is not great at least
for now. It is true that, if a national government is non-democratic, its ministers necessarily will
be so also. In such a situation, the national parliament is either equally undemocratic, or it is
supine, or both. I am not being flip here. Without pointing fingers at any particular nation, if a
country is considered undemocratic, the undemocratic characteristics of the executive will
necessarily affect the national legislature.
d. Permanent Secretariat. In the face of the OHADA structure=s undemocratic aspects,
the administrators of OHADA, the Permanent Secretariat, have devised a pragmatic unofficial
channel for public response. These are the so-called Anational commissions.@ Not established by
the Treaty, these commissions have evolved because they are necessary. In the Côte d=Ivoire, for
example, the very energetic head of the Ivorian national commission is actively soliciting
recommendations for improvements to existing codes.157 Because the committee consists of
legal professionals, they do reflect at least a sliver of informed popular opinion, and contribute to
at least some popular buy-in for the OHADA laws.
2.

Enforcement.

No matter how elegantly it is drafted, a statute is only as effective as its enforcement. We
have seen that the OHADA laws= uniformity throughout the territory is protected by the CCJA=s
authority to interpret. Execution of judgments, on the other hand, inevitably require an interface
between the OHADA regime and national judicial system. Once a court has rendered its
judgment under OHADA laws, the nation=s bailiff has to levy, and quarrels about the execution
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Interview with Pres. Kouassi Kouadio, Magistrate, supra note 144.
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of the judgment end up in national courts.158
Indeed, enforcement is a topic of significant interest to the local legal profession, as
demonstrated in the interviews I conducted in the summer of 2004 with practitioners, in-house
counsel, judges and professors located in the OHADA territory. The study was preliminary and
the information anecdotal, but the interlocutors= focus was, strikingly, on the implementation of
the laws.159 The interviewees had acceptedBeven embracedBthe reality of the OHADA. For
example, a common refrain among the francophone legal specialists was to praise the clarity and
sophistication of the OHADA laws, but to lament the difficulty of obtaining execution on the
judgments.160 The issue arises at the junction where the parallel legal universe touches the
national system, that is, at the point where the judgments rendered by the national courts have
gone through their final appeal, whether or not to the CCJA. It can even be difficult to ascertain
which national authority is responsible for the execution of judgments under OHADA laws.161
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See, e.g., Interview with Justice NKO T. Irene NJOYA, Advocate General, South West Court of Appeal,
in Buéa, Cameroon, on July 8, 2004.
159

For a general description of the interviewing process, see supra note 6. In a subsequent study, I will
focus on the interface of OHADA in anglophone regions, including anglophone Cameroon, Ghana and Nigeria. The
ease with which the French-based OHADA system is received in anglophone (common law) regions may provide
additional information not only about OHADA=s probable evolution, but also about the accuracy of the assertions
about French-based law being an ineffective and even perhaps destructive transplant. See, e.g., the discussion in Part
I.B.
160

However, the clarity of OHADA laws may be enough to make them useful despite execution difficulties.
See Interview with Me. QT, Douala, Cameroon, on July 5, 2004 (suggesting that the government controls the
prosecutor who controls the police which controls execution of judgments); Interview with Me. BK, supra note 72
(emphasizing the importance of effective judgment-execution, but also praising the OHADA laws= clarity).
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Henri Tchantchou, Le Contentieux de l=Exécution et des Saisies dans le Nouveau Droit OHADA (article
49 AUPSRVE), 46 JURIDIS PÉRIODIQUE (Apr.-June 2001), available at
http://www.ohada.com/imprimable.php?vu=11&article_biblio=447 (2001) (discussing the difficulty of identifying
the local, non-OHADA authority responsible for ordering the execution of judgments in Cameroon, particularly in
anglophone Cameroon). In anglophone Cameroon, the writ of fi fa (Afieri facias@) has been replaced by the new
Aexecutory formula@ (Aformule exécutoire@) and stamp. Interview with Justice NKO, supra note 158.
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It may seem like a colossal waste of effort to spend time and energy discussing a legal
system when execution of judgments remains uncertain. On the other hand, it is reassuring that
the legal profession is taking OHADA seriously enough to be discussing the niceties of
judgment-execution.162 And judgments are being executed. Further, it is important to appreciate
that, with every step taken, the OHADA system becomes more fully woven into the commercial
fabric of the region, and thus more difficult to reverse. This in turn means that long-term benefits
may still be reaped; it does not mean that no short-term benefits are available.
3.

OHADA=s Immediate ASoft@ Benefits

Even when OHADA is not yet providing the Ahard@ benefit of judgments rendered and
executed in a predictable and transparent manner, it is offering a soft but immediate benefit. In
Senegal, where the economy is growing at a respectable clip,163 indications are that the OHADA
laws= consumers are beginning to recognize them as local laws, although foreign companies are
resisting this perception.164 In the Côte d=Ivoire, which is still reeling under the civil strife that
started in September 2002, members of the local legal profession seem to view the OHADA laws
as a promise of better times.165 When, once again, commerce will be freely possible, the legal
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Sylvain Souop, Pour Qui Sonne le Glas de l=Exécution Provisoire? A Propos du 2ième Arrêt de la CCJA,
002-2001 du 11 octobre 2001, Affaire Epoux Karnib c/ Société Générale de Banques Côte dàIvoire (SGBCI),
OHADATA D-02-06, also available at http://www.ohada.com/imprimable.php?vu=28&article_biblio=293 (2002)
(discussing risks created by provisional execution of judgments before all appeals are completed).
163

Averaging at 5% real GDP growth from 1995 to 2003, and estimated at 5.5% in 2003. Central
Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, Senegal, Economy, available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sg.html#Econ (last visited October 24, 2004).
164

Interview with Me. TT, supra note 72.
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Interviews with TE, DL &, QF, supra note 72. The Côte d=Ivoire=s estimated real GDP growth is -1.9%
for 2003. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, Senegal, Economy, available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iv.html#con (last visited October 24, 2004).
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profession will be ready with a relatively clean, transparent judicial system to support commerce.
In Cameroon, the local legal professionals to all evidence experience OHADA somewhere
between those two extremes. For example, a well-respected Cameroonian scholar studying the
OHADA regime has recognized that published decisions are prerequisites to a predictable and
transparent judicial system. Because the francophone region of Cameroon does not publish an
official journal of decisions, he has taken on himself to do so.166 His efforts to promote
transparency have gained particular importance as they parallel the anglophone region=s preexisting publication of cases. These moves toward transparency are geared to increase
predictability and reduce corruption.
On the other hand, it is clear that for many members of the legal profession in these
countries, Agood governance@ means political governance, not corporate governance.167 Issues of
good corporate governance are to all appearances almost at the level of luxury. One member of
the legal profession described political corruption at A500%@ in his country, but he also said that
OHADA laws relating to creation and management of corporations were vastly clearer than the
pre-existing law.168 It is hard to see the statements as consistent unless we understand the
OHADA laws as partly aspirational. Of course some OHADA judgments are executed, and

166

As a point of comparison, Cameroon=s estimated real GDP growth for 2003 is 4.2%. Central Intelligence
Agency, World Factbook, Senegal, Economy, available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cm.html#Econ (last visited October 24, 2004). Professor PaulGérard Pougoué, Vice Rector in charge of teaching and professor in the Legal and Political Science Faculty at the
University of Yaoundé II, publishes Juridis Périodique. Interview with Prof Pougoué, supra note 95.
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Interview with Me. BK, supra note 72.
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Interview with Me. FB, supra note 88.
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some legal professionals do focus on corporate governance in the context of OHADA.169 Thus,
OHADA is beginning to enhance transparency and protect property, but at least some of these
benefits belong to the future.

III.

OHADA=s LONG-TERM IMPACT
A.

IMPACT TO-DATE

This survey suggests that although OHADA=s articulated purpose focuses on foreign
investment, its implementation is supportive of domestic investment, as well. On the procedural
side OHADA is designed to avoid existing authoritarian structures, while on the substantive side
it has established a structure to protect private property and enhance incentives for capital
formation. Specifically, the OHADA nations established a legislative and judicial system
devoted to business laws, operating parallel to their national analogue. In the late 1990s,
OHADA adopted statutes, including a corporate law, conceived to encourage responsible
behavior by management and to balance the interests of foreign and domestic investors. The
OHADA laws accomplish all this while retaining a simplicity compatible with an evolving legal
infrastructure. Thus, the OHADA regime in fact addresses concerns about the utility of civil-law
models in developing countries that have been articulated by comparative law and development
economics. For example, OHADA=s laws and institutions protect property rights in private
transactions by many means, including respecting both majority and minority owners and by
emphasizing transparency.
The mere fact that OHADA=s drafters have consciously or unconsciously tracked those
169

Interview with Prof. Pougoué, supra note 95.
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theories gleaned from comparative law and development economics still does not prove that the
theories are correct. The question is how to measure the OHADA project=s success in achieving
its goals of enhancing foreign investment, specifically, and economic development generally.
We have already seen anecdotal evidence that members of the legal profession within the
OHADA territory are unsure of the laws= long-term future, but nevertheless remain supportive of
its efforts.
Part of the measure of success is found in the OHADA system=s very existence. The
OHADA member-states have accomplished a great deal: sixteen (soon seventeen) countries have
together constructed supranational institutions, including a legislature and a court, and have
thereby implemented a system of uniform business laws throughout their joint territory. We have
seen that legal professionals within the OHADA territory do praise the value of the OHADA
regime.170 Practicing lawyers, judges, academics, business people, and members of the OHADA
institutional hierarchy, all of whom live daily with the OHADA laws, expressed their support of
and hope for the OHADA system. In particular, they praise the laws= clarity.
Otherwise, though, we have to recognize that any external measure will necessarily
reflect far more than just the impact of the OHADA system. In other words, a look at trends in
foreign or domestic investment within the region, not to speak of gross national product, cannot
alone be an accurate reflection of the OHADA=s success because of all the other factors that are
relevant.171 However, the enumerated factors are not good: for almost all OHADA countries, per
170

See Interview with BK, supra note 72, and QT, supra note 160 (praising the OHADA laws= clarity); see
also Interview with Prof. Assi-Esso, supra note 95 (praising OHADA laws= clarity, the rapidity of its procedure
including in particular the execution of judgments).
171

OHADA=s articulated purpose is to increase foreign investment. See supra note 2. However, the
ultimate goal is not to allow the region to reap the benefits of additional investment. For one view of the applicable
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capita gross national product is less than US$ 700 per year,172 and only one OHADA country has
exceeded two percent gross national product growth in the 1990s. We can also consider changes
in Transparency International=s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as a proxy for measuring the
protection of private property.173 While a rising CPI cannot alone prove whether OHADA has
been successful, the CPI during the period since the OHADA laws= adoption is not reassuring:
the Côte d=Ivoire index has fallen perceptibly, and Cameroon has inched up, but only from a very
low level.174
To be sure, the first OHADA laws have been effective only since 1998, a very brief
experience in comparison with the duration of the institutions challenged by OHADA.175 Future
research will focus on how regional, domestic enterprises are using OHADA, and how foreign

criteria in measuring development, see supra note 10 (discussing in particular the views of Jeffrey Sachs and his coauthors, and Amartya Sen).
172

Only Gabon has exceeded US$700 per capita GNI in 2002 and 2003 (which it has accomplished
handily). See The World Bank Group, World Development Indicators: Data Query, available at
http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/ (downloaded Jan. 30, 2005). AGNI@ is Agross national income,@ the
terminology that the World Bank now uses instead of AGDP@ (Agross domestic product@). The World Bank defines
GNI as follows: AGross national income (GNI) (formerly gross national product, or GNP) is the sum of gross value
added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) that are not included in the valuation of output
plus net receipts of income from abroad.@ The World Bank Group, Data & Statistics, Methodology, National
Accounts: Output and Expenditure, available at http://www.worldbank.org/data/working/def7.html (downloaded Jan
30, 2005).
173

For a discussion of another, similar proxy, see William Easterly & Ross Levine, Africa=s Growth
Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1203, 1209 (1997) (recommending the use of the Ablack
market exchange rate premium@ as a proxy for Atrade, exchange rate, and price distortions@).
174

The cleanest OHADA state in the 2003 survey was Senegal at 3.2, putting it just about at the half-way
mark of perceived corruption among the 133 tested nations. The Côte d'Ivoire's index was 2.7 in the 2002 survey,
describing 2001 [pre civil strife]. http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2002/2002.08.28.cpi.en.html
(downloaded Oct. 9, 2003)
175

See BUSLAW, supra note 1 at 34. *[Registre du Commerce et du Crédit Mobilier (RCCM) is centralized
at the national level, and again at the OHADA level; AU General Commercial, art. 20.]
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investors view the new regime.176 For the moment, however, the strongest positive indicator may
be that anglophone countries have begun to enquire about joining.177 Given the historical friction
between the anglophone and francophone former colonies, that is a remarkably promising sign.178
It is thus worth considering briefly what additional steps OHADA should take in order to
consolidate its ability to support economic development.
B.

NEXT STEPS

We have seen that legal professionals within the OHADA territory praise in particular the
laws= clarity. Practicing lawyers, judges, academics, business people, and members of the
OHADA institutional hierarchy, all of whom live daily with the OHADA laws, also expressed
176

Foreign investors in the OHADA territory do not necessarily use the OHADA form. ExxonMobil formed
a subsidiary, Esso Exploration and Production Chad Inc. (Esso-Chad), to build a $3.7 billion underground oil
pipeline from Chad, through Cameroon, to the Atlantic. Somini Sengupta, The Making of an African Petrostate
(Feb. 18, 2004) available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/04/business/worldbusiness/04fdi.html?pagewanted=print&position= (last visited
Feb. 18, 2004). While I do not know exactly when Esso-Chad was formed, it probably was not much before January
2001. See WORLD OIL (Jan. 2001) (referring to this Esso-Chad and discussing the commencement of an oil pipeline
from Chad through Cameroon to the Atlantic coast) available at
http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/m3159/1_222/70204444/print.jhtml (last visited Apr. 2, 2004). The OHADA
corporate law was available since January of 1998. See SOCCOM, supra note 85 at 17-18 (The OHADA corporate
law (Le Droit des Sociétés Commerciales et du Groupement d=Intérêt Economique) entered into force on January 1,
1998). Because of the suffix AInc.@, Esso-Chad probably is a US company, and certainly is not formed under
OHADA. When I sought additional information on Esso-Chad, the public-relations department of ExxonMobil had
no information and refused to put me in contact with the legal department. See March 4, 2004 email from Russ A.
Roberts, ExxonMobil Upstream Public Affairs.
177

Cameroon, already a member of OHADA is bilingual English-French and has a dual legal system. See
supra note 6 (Cameroon as bilingual and charter member of OHADA). See also BUSLAW, supra note 1 at 22-23
(discussing Cameroon=s constitutional mandate of French-English bilingualism). See also United Nations, Core
Document Forming Part of the Reports of States Parties B Cameroon, HRI/CORE/1/Add. 109, Part II.A (June 19,
2000), available at http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord2000/documentation/coredocs/hri-core-1-add109.htm (last visited
Apr. 2, 2004) (AFrench and British colonial rule left Cameroon with a dual legal system, which has elements of the
Napoleonic Code and common law. This duality is further complicated by the coexistence of customary and statutory
law.@). Based on casual conversations with persons interested in West Africa generally and OHADA specifically,
Ghana is generally considered most likely to be the first fully anglophone adherent, although negotiations are
apparently ongoing with Nigeria as well.
178

OHADA is open to all members of the African Union. OHADA Treaty, art. 53 (the Organization of
African Unity, in French, l=Organisation de l=Unité Africaine (OUA), is the predecessor to today=s African Union).
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two principal complaints. First, the consumers of OHADA laws desire easier access to the court
decisions and scholarly analysis of those laws.179 While a privately run website,
www.ohada.com, includes texts of the code and of decisions, and makes scholarly commentary
available for a fee, the Internet provides only limited access because of the unreliability of
connection in many locales.180 In order to have a reliable, rapid connection to the Internet in
Cameroon, for example, the only viable solution is a satellite hookup, which is relatively
expensive.181
If the Internet is not part of the solution available to all, the principal alternative is
published documentation; this solution costs money. The OHADA Treaty as amended requires
each state-party to contribute to the operations of the institutions.182 To date, these contributions
have been honored in the breach, leaving the OHADA institutions underfunded.183 Therefore,
they are not in a position to provide the documentation in published form, at least not in

179

These are, respectively, the classic Ajurisprudence@ and Adoctrine@ at the heart of French-system
interpretation of codes and statutes. See, e.g., SCHLESINGER, ET AL., supra note 35 at 280 (describing Adoctrine@ and
Ajurisprudence,@ and underscoring their importance to French judicial decisions). See also Merryman, Deviation,
supra note 35 at 116 (asserting that French judges are not purely passive and do make law); Mitchel de S.-O-L=E
Lasser, Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System, 104 YALE L.J. 1325, 1367-68,
1371-75, 1381 (1995) (asserting the importance of precedent to French judges, while acknowledging that it still may
be less so than to common law judges).
180

There also exists an official website for OHADA: www.ohada.org. This will in time contain essential
information, including the Journal Officiel; however, much material remains to be uploaded.
181

In Douala, Cameroon, for example, both Citibank and GICAM had satellite hook-ups. Interview with
Mr. SADJO, supra note 139; interview with Mrs. Alice Flora NGASSAM, Douala, Cameroon, on July 7, 2004.
182

OHADA Treaty, Art. 43 (describing OHADA=s funding as including allocations from the member-states).
See also Règlement No. 002/2003CM Relatif au Mécanisme de Financement Autonome de l=OHADA,Arts. 3 & 4
(stipulating the allocation as 0.05% of imports from outside OHADA, supplied for consumption within the OHADA
territory); Décision, Conseil des Ministres, No. 004/2004/CM of March 27, 2004(stipulating the allocation among
the member-states).
183

Interview with Pres Kouassi Kouadio, supra note 144 [Abidjan, CIV, June 29, 2004].
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sufficient quantity. A private non-governmental organization raises its own funds to commission
and distribute documentation;184 it has donated literally thousands of copies of the OHADA
uniform laws and analyses of those laws. It has also contributed toward the regular publication
of OHADA=s own Journal Officiel. This is the official OHADA document that publishes
decisions of the CCJA. Further, the Permanent Secretariat is currently constructing a website on
which the Journal Officiel will be posted.185 In other words, much is being done to make laws
accessible.
Nevertheless, people who need to know about OHADA do not. That includes potential
foreign consumers of the legal system, as well as domestic users. Within the region, the U.S.
economic advisers to whom I spoke were aware of the OHADA laws= existence, but the reports
they had obtained from U.S. investors were generally unfavorable, to all appearances in part
based on whether the U.S. investors had won their latest litigation.186 The foreign investors and
their national representatives must have easy access to current information about OHADA and its
evolution.
Local lawyers and business people, including in-house banking lawyers, too, must have
complete and current information about OHADA. For this, it is important to continue
distributing books and articles. However, it also is critical that ERSUMA, the OHADA school,

184

L=Association pour l=Unification du Droit en Afrique (UNIDA), 7, avenue de Ségur, 75007 Paris, France.
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Email of Feb. 24, 2005, from OHADA Permanent Secretary Lucien Johnson to the author (noting that the
Journal Officiel will be posted at www.ohada.org; on file with author).
186

Interview with Ms. Portia E. McCollum, Economics Counselor, Embassy of the United States, Abidjan,
CIV, June 29, 2004; telephone conversation July 21, 2004 with Mr. Solomon Oshinaike, economic adviser, U.S.
Consulate, Douala, Cameroon (reporting that US investors tend not to know about OHADA).
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have the resources to educate more professionals,187 and that the local academics and bar
organize parallel educational opportunities, including regular seminars and workshops. The
Permanent Secretariat needs funding so that it can support these initiatives.
The legislative side, too, needs attention. The Council of Ministers, with the Permanent
Secretariat=s support, has been making good use of the national commissions.188 Again, too, it is
important that the Permanent Secretariat have the resources necessary to enhance and monitor the
national commissions. These are critical to the feedback loop between OHADA=s legislative
process and at least the legal professionals, if not the public at large. In addition, they help the
representatives to the Council of Ministers ascertain their national government=s position on
relevant topics.189 In other words, they have a singular role in enhancing democratic aspects, and
therefore the responsiveness, of the OHADA structure. This is an area that is particularly
sensitive, as it touches national sovereignty in a way that is instantly recognizable. We have seen
that laws adopted by the Council of Ministers automatically become internal law of OHADA=s
member-states.190 The heads of state are, apparently, considering reviewing the existing structure
under the treaty.191 In many of these OHADA countries, increasing the national executive=s
supervisory role over OHADA will not increase democratic input. Thus, it is important to
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See supra Part II.B.1.b (describing ERSUMA).
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See supra Part II.B.1.c & d (discussing the Council of Ministers and, in the context of the Permanent
Secretariat=s role, the national commissions).
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Interview with Pres. Kouassi Kouadio, supra note 144(suggesting the importance of OHADA to the
national governments).
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See supra note 134 (describing the automatic application of OHADA laws).
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Interview with Pres. Kouassi Kouadio, supra note 144 (discussing the risk of intervention by heads of
state in the evolution of OHADA, suggesting the importance of OHADA to the national governments).
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support and even formalize the national committees, and to leave them under the Council of
Ministers= authority, while allocating administrative oversight to a reinforced Permanent
Secretariat.
Clearly, one of the most difficult areas to address is OHADA=s judicial system. The
CCJA is well respected because the judges who sit on that court are sophisticated and, from all I
have heard, serve with integrity.192 As the court continues to publish its own decisions, including
detailed reference to the lower courts= decisions from which the appeal arose, the CCJA is
automatically increasing transparency. However, local legal professionals are quick to
acknowledge that the CCJA=s transparency has not eradicated corruption in the national judicial
systems.193 We have seen that the legal profession complains of a breakdown at the transition
between the OHADA regime and the national judicial systems. They report a lack of
predictability when the local authorities are called upon to execute a judgment or arbitral
award.194 Since the OHADA Treaty chose not to push the transfer of sovereignty to the point of
establishing a separate OHADA method of enforcement, the practical impact of the OHADA
laws, at least on the short term, depends on the will of the national governments.
This a difficult problem that even fundamental modifications in the OHADA judicial
structure cannot immediately correct. To all evidence, national governments that are already
questioning an earlier concession of sovereignty pursuant to the OHADA treaty will not now
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Interview with Me. Virgile NGASSAM Njike, in Douala, Cameroon, on July 3, 2004 (reporting that the
Cameroonian bar admires the CCJA).
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Interview with Dr. François Komoin, supra note 138; Interview with FB, supra note 88.
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Interview with Justice NKO, supra note 158 (describing difficulties of judgment-execution); Interview
with Pres. Kouassi Kouadio, supra note 144 (referring to judgment-execution as a mess).

59

Draft 031605

want to cede enforcement power. If a national executive that is itself corrupt, as is the case in
part of the territory, is prepared to punish judges who fail to rule as instructed by redeploying
them to the least desirable courts in the country, no amount of transparency will, at least in the
short run, provide effective shaming.195
On the other hand, any reform effort has to start somewhere. Thus, ERSUMA=s
education efforts and the related conferences can hope to have some effect on ethical
perspectives. There already is a cadre of professionals within the territory who are trying to
behave ethically to have property and contracts recognized and respected; the OHADA regime
provides support by the laws= clarity and through contacts to like-minded professionals.196 This
may appear utopian, but it need not be interpreted that way. Change can occur only if pressure is
applied everywhere simultaneously, in search of the proper pressure-points.197
Interestingly, while the local lawyers and business people are perfectly aware of the
national governments= negative impact on the application of the OHADA laws, even in countries
with more impediments to commerce than in Senegal, these consumers of OHADA laws do not
view the OHADA regime as useless. As noted above, even these consumers uniformly expect
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Interview with Me. QT, supra note 160 (referring to Achantage alimentaire,@ meaning blackmailing by
threatening to cut off sustenanceBin this case career advancement).
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The theory of networks and of social influence are critical here. See generally, Claire Moore Dickerson,
Corporations As Cities: Targeting Nodes in Overlapping Networks, 29 J. CORP. L. 533, 544-551 (2004) (describing
the power of networks). See also Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360 (1973);
MARK BUCHANAN, NEXUS: SMALL WORLDS AND THE GROUNDBREAKING SCIENCE OF NETWORKS (2002); DUNCAN J.
WATTS, SIX DEGREES: THE SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE (2003).
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This assertion is consistent with network theory. See generally Dickerson, Overlapping
Networks, (discussing the use of network theory to obtain institutional change, and recognizing the difficulty of
identifying the relevant pressure points).
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that the OHADA laws would at some point in the future attain their full promise.198 Whether
that proves to be wishful thinking remains to be seen. However, shoring up the existing
structures will increase the likelihood of success.
So far, the bulk of the discussion has considered OHADA=s promise in the context of
local economic development. There is another, related aspect that was hinted at in the
Introduction, and that emphasizes the importance of protecting another structure of OHADA: its
uniformity within the territory.
Countries in the South clearly are brutally aware of Northern influence. Within this
reality, OHADA represents an effort to take back the reins. Measuring how that works on the
ground is the next phase of my research, but I remain optimistic that the uniformity may be an
effective, stealth weapon that will help empower the South in its discussions with the North. If
the region taken as a whole is commercially viable and possesses a single form of business laws,
and if the entire region interprets and enforces them uniformly, individual countries will be able
to require that foreign-based multinational corporations comply with local law if they are to
invest anywhere in the region. The territory could, for example, decide to adopt and apply an
expansive definition of Acorporate interest,@ thus mobilizing a tool with which to protect its
citizens and its environment.199 If the other assertions are not utopian, this one may be.
However, what is utopian today can be reality tomorrow.

IV.

CONCLUSION
198

Interview with Me. QT, supra note 160 (noting that, even without an effective means of executing
judgments, the OHADA laws and their clarity are a preparation for what is to follow).
199

See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing Acorporate interest@).
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The OHADA legal regime is designed to help create a plausible economic climate. It is a
mechanism that generates business laws whose clarity is designed to provide guidance and thus
predictability even when the supporting gloss of case law and scholarly commentary is hard to
obtain. Substantively, the laws are measured and favor neither the powerful nor the weak.
OHADA provides much more than laws, because it also has established fundamental
legal institutions. The Council of Ministers promulgates new laws and modifies old ones; its
structure automatically includes the perspective of the national governments of member-states. It
is developing additional mechanisms to enhance its ability to obtain feedback from the legal
professionals and business people who apply the OHADA laws. The Common Court of Justice
and Arbitration interprets the OHADA laws in order to preserve those laws= uniformity across the
entire OHADA region. This court also sets an example of transparency and skill. With the
support of the Permanent Secretariat, the regional school serves to reinforce and enhance all
these efforts by providing continuing legal education. In addition to these institutional efforts,
legal professionals are developing informal networks that create a community of OHADA
adherents, thereby confirming that OHADA is putting down roots.
In the process, OHADA gives lie to the view that French-based legal systems impede
development. There may indeed be a correlation between economic failure and such legal
systems, but modern economic analysis suggests that there is no causation. Indeed, since the
OHADA countries have a civilian heritage, and since their legal professionals are steeped in
civilian legal norms, a French-based system may well offer particular efficiencies there.200
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Because Cameroon is bilingual and bijural, the region also is a laboratory experimenting with the
extension of the OHADA regime to English-language, common-law regions. That is the object of another study.
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It is too early in the process to be dogmatic about OHADA=s success. However, the
commitment of legal professionals in the area, and the interest expressed by neighboring states
speak to the new regime=s importance. This process of education is proceeding apace. The
OHADA institutions and the legal professionals in the region are working on the transition
between the OHADA regime and the national judicial systems, in particular in the area of
execution of judgments. As these efforts continue, the businesses and legal professionals in the
capital exporting nations need to learn about the OHADA regime=s professionalism and promise.
This article is one step to that end.
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